Page 1 1 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 3 Case Nos. 12-11076-shl Adv. Case No. 12-01662-shl 5 6 In the Matter of: 7 8 ARCAPITA BANK B.S.C.(C), et al, 9 10 Debtors. 11 12 HOPPER, 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. 15 FALCON GAS STORAGE COMPANY, INC., 16 Defendant. 17 18 U.S. Bankruptcy Court 19 One Bowling Green 20 New York, New York 21 22 January 16, 2013 23 11:23 AM 24 25

Page 3 1 Hearing re: Doc. #757 Motion to Approve Debtors Motion for 2 Entry of an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 105(a) and Fed. R. 3 Bankr. P. 3007 Approving claim Objection Procedures 4 5 Hearing re: Doc. #770 Motion to Extend Exclusivity Period 6 for Filing a Chapter 11 Plan and Disclosure 7 Statement/Debtors' Motion to Further Extend Exclusive Periods to File a Plan or Plans of Reorganization and to 8 9 Solicit Acceptances Thereof 10 Hearing re: Doc. #12 Motion to Authorize -- Debtors' Motion 11 12 for Interim and Final Orders (A) Authorizing Debtors to (I) 13 Continue Existing Cash Management System, Bank Accounts, and 14 Business Forms and (II) Continue Ordinary Course 15 Intercompany Transactions; and (B) Granting an Extension of 16 Time to Comply with the Requirements of Section 345(b) of 17 the Bankruptcy Code 18 Hearing re: Doc. #279 Motion For Relief From Stay Re: Tide 19 20 Natural Gas I, LP and Tide Natural Gas Storage II, LP 21 22 Hearing re: Adversary proceeding: 12-01662-shl Hopper v. 23 Falcon Gas Storage Company, Inc. Status Conference 24 25 Hearing re: Doc. #11 Motion to Approve/Falcons Motion for

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Page 8 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 THE COURT: Arcapita Bank B.S.C. 3 (Pause) 4 THE COURT: So let's get appearances first. 5 MR. ROSENTHAL: Good morning, Your Honor, Michael 6 Rosenthal of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher with Craig Millet and 7 Josh Weisser, who will be here momentarily, on behalf of the 8 debtors. 9 THE COURT: All right. 10 MR. FLECK: Good morning, Your Honor, Evan Fleck of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy on behalf of official 11 committee of unsecured creditors. 12 13 MR. WOOD: Good morning, Your Honor, my name is Trey Wood, I represent Tide Natural Gas Storage I Limited 14 15 Partner and Tide Natural Gas Storage II Limited Partnership. 16 We have a motion to lift stay that's separate today. 17 THE COURT: All right. MR. ZDUNKEWICZ: Good morning, Your Honor, David 18 Zdunkewicz with Andrews Kurth for the Hopper Parties. 19 20 THE COURT: All right. 21 MR. VAN TOL: Your Honor, good morning, Pieter Van 22 Tol from Hogan Lovells for the punitive defendant, HSBC. MS. HERTHER-SPIRO: Nicole Herther-Spiro, Dechert 23 LLP for Standard Chartered Bank. 24 25 THE COURT: All right. All right, I think that's

Page 9 1 everyone. 2 MR. ROSENTHAL: Your Honor, I resisted at the last hearing giving you an update about the case, but I can't 3 resist -- I can't resist this time. 4 5 THE COURT: All right. 6 MR. ROSENTHAL: A couple points. 7 First, I wanted to let you know the DIP financing 8 is fully funded and closed. As you recall, it was 9 originally -- we had authority to borrow \$150 million, but 10 there was -- \$25 million of it was subject to some further 11 confirmatory due diligence from Fortress. So they did their 12 confirmatory due diligence and that additional amount was 13 funded on Monday. 14 THE COURT: All right. 15 MR. ROSENTHAL: So we have access to the full 16 150-. 17 You'll also remember that there was an agreement that we had to transfer certain assets back to AIHL and if 18 19 we didn't there would have been a \$250,000 fee payable to 20 Fortress. We were able to transfer those assets back and we 21 did not have to pay the fee. 22 THE COURT: All right. 23 MR. ROSENTHAL: On the -- you also remember that 24 before the end of the year you approved a sale of our senior 25 living facilities in the UK, the Sunrise -- so-called

Sunrise sale. That sale has closed and we received proceeds of approximately \$36 million. Those proceeds under the DIP were -- were required prepayment. So they came in and they repaid the DIP on -- on Monday.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ROSENTHAL: You'll remember that we have \$35 million tied up with placement banks. Well, the bad news is that we haven't been successful in accessing all of the placement cash. The good news is that we were able to get a small piece of it, \$1.4 million back from one of the banks, Ted Hammond Capital. Still working on the rest.

You've heard the saga about plan negotiations ongoing, full blown. We can talk about that more.

We continue to be careful about our cash. As of

January 5th we had about \$148 million of cash on hand.

After you -- we applied the Sunrise proceeds to the DIP and
we added to our cash the funding from the final \$25 million

I think we have something in the neighborhood of

\$139 million -- \$138 million as we -- as we sit here today.

In terms of variances from our actual to budgeted we are running about -- a favorable variance of about \$71 million from the inception of the case.

So that's sort of a short -- short analysis.

Now, we have a number of things on the docket today. What I would suggest is that we take up exclusivity

Page 11 1 first. 2 THE COURT: All right. 3 MR. ROSENTHAL: As you know, Your Honor, we were here on the 9th seeking an extension until the 14th and we 4 5 had a discussion with the Court, we had a discussion in 6 court about whether that was sufficient time, and the 7 parties at that time were suggesting that a further extension may be advisable. We kicked around a date of -- I 8 9 think it was the 23rd. 10 Ultimately we did, you know, have some further discussions and we agreed that an extension until 11 12 September 28th -- September 28th -- January 28th was a more 13 appropriate date. I'm not being -- trying to be optimistic 14 here. January 28th. 15 And so we filed a motion on Friday, the Court 16 entered a bridge order extending exclusivity until today. 17 I'm not aware of any parties that have objected to 18 the extension. The UCC supports the extension. The ad hoc group supports the extension. The ad hoc group has agreed 19 20 that their -- that the date by which we would have to 21 cleanse them of any material non-public information will be 22 extended until the 28th as well. 23 THE COURT: All right. 24 MR. ROSENTHAL: So there are no questions there. 25 As I said at the prior hearing, Your Honor, the

debtors are ready, willing, and able, you know, right this minute file a Chapter 11 plan, but at the same time we think that it's beneficial to have input from the unsecured creditors' committee and from the ad hoc group, if possible, about the potential splits.

And while we've tried to incorporate what we think is a reasonable resolution of the allocation issues and the various compromises, it -- we'd like, if possible, to have further input from the UCC.

As you know the UCC itself is in discussions, they haven't yet reached an internal consensus about what would be an acceptable allocation, but they -- those discussions are ongoing daily I am told.

So we believe that there is sufficient cause that has been shown to extend exclusivity, an extension is in the best interest of the estates, there's no intent to delay creditors. In fact, as you know, the committee and the ad hoc group supports the extension. And this enables the debtors to be able to file a more informed plan, we believe, by the 28th.

THE COURT: All right. Anyone wish to be heard on this request for an extension of exclusivity?

MR. FLECK: Your Honor, Evan Fleck once again on behalf of official creditors' committee.

On behalf of the committee I agree with everything

that Mr. Rosenthal said, and my partner, Mr. Dunn, was here at the prior hearing and gave the Court hopefully some helpful color on the deliberations that are taking place at the committee level as well as at the ad hoc group. there is a call with the committee members that is beginning -- began two minutes ago, so it is a very active dialogue, people understand that a lot of time and money that is being used to facilitate these discussions, but we think that they're important and that is why we support the request. I'd also note that the committee is in discussions with Standard Chartered Bank as well, we think that's an important component of the creditors' support for the plan, and together with the debtors, we have been having a constructive dialogue with Standard Chartered Bank as well. THE COURT: All right. MR. FLECK: I'd be happy to answer any questions the Court has. THE COURT: No, that's fine. Thank you. MR. FLECK: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Anyone else wish to be heard? All right, based on what I have before me in the papers and equally, if not more so, the discussion we had at the last hearing about where things were, which was I think very informative and fulsome, I will grant the request to

extend the exclusive periods for cause under Section 11

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Page 14 1 U.S.C. 1121(d). 2 MR. ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much, Your Honor. We will -- I think we have a hard copy of the 3 4 order, but we also have it on disk. 5 THE COURT: All right. 6 MR. ROSENTHAL: Now, I'd like to -- I think we 7 should turn our attention to the claim objection procedures 8 motion. 9 THE COURT: All right. 10 MR. ROSENTHAL: And I'm going turn the podium over to my colleague, Josh Weisser. 11 12 MR. WEISSER: Good morning, Your Honor, Josh 13 Weisser, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher on behalf of the debtors. 14 As my colleague, Mr. Rosenthal mentioned, the next 15 thing up for hearing is the motion for a claims objection 16 procedures, I think it's number 1 on your agenda. 17 The purpose of this I would hope is pretty 18 straightforward. It's just to establish some additional procedures for -- that will govern the claims administration 19 20 process and be in addition to the things that are set forth 21 in Bankruptcy Rule 3007. 22 The rationale is simply the claims pool. We've 23 looked at the claims pool, there's over 550 claims or proofs 24 of claim, and I think they're asserting approximately 25 \$6 billion in claim amount. And having looked at that claim

pool and how we categorize different potential objections we've looked at, you know, what potential categories we like. I think we set forth as additional permitted categories, which is probably the first of the two main components of our motion.

The first would be that it's the additional permitted categories. There are approximately ten I think categories in the order which we think that we would potentially be objecting to claims on an omnibus basis.

The second key component is notice. Rather than provide a copy of the full objection to every claimant we would propose to be providing them with just a simple notice that's been attached to our order or substantially in that form, potentially a little bit more individualized. We'd let every creditor know their -- you know, give them a warning by saying your creditor name or your identification number, claim number, amount, classification, provide people with a sense of the process itself and any important dates that would apply to their particular claim in that objection.

So other than that we would like to adhere to 3007.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WEISSER: The committee has reviewed the proposed form of order. Monday we submitted a notice with

Page 16 1 the revised order attached. I believe that reflects all of the committees' comments. Their comments are primarily two. 3 I can walk through the proposed changes. THE COURT: Yeah, that would be helpful. 4 5 MR. WEISSER: Okay. There are two basic changes I 6 guess, and Mr. Fleck can maybe disagree by the first if he'd 7 like to or chime in. The first is in a number of different categories 8 9 -- or paragraphs initially we simply provided that the 10 debtors had the ability to object on an omnibus basis for 11 these reasons, or they pertained to how the debtors would 12 handle the claims administration process. 13 The committees' comments were also -- also wanted to confirm that other parties in interest were also included 14 15 in those procedures. We believe that this is consistent 16 with 502 and 3007. 17 Their second change was more of a confirmation 18 also, and it just said that they confirmed that normal discovery rules and normal burdens of proof still applied to 19 20 the actual process itself. 21 THE COURT: All right. 22 MR. WEISSER: And with that we believe that the 23 committee supports entry of this motion and we would ask 24 that Your Honor approve it.

THE COURT: All right. Anyone wish to be heard in

Pg 17 of 85 Page 17 1 connection with the claims objection procedures motion? 2 All right. Yes, I always obviously take a look at this and would have a different reaction if in fact it 3 4 changed any of the burdens of proof or things of that sort, 5 but I understand it to be a procedural mechanism for teeing 6 these things up in a sensible way and efficient way. 7 So with that I will grant the request for claims objection procedures here. 8 9 MR. WEISSER: Thank you, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Thank you. MR. WEISSER: With that I'll turn it back over to 11 12 Mr. Rosenthal to address cash management. 13 MR. ROSENTHAL: Your Honor, if you'd turn to the cash management issues. We're here today on another interim 14 15 cash management order. 16 As with all of them before we think we have an 17 agreement on the cash management issues. We've submitted a 18 budget. There are -- there are two points I want to highlight for the Court. 19 20 One is that this budget includes -- if you look at deal funding -- includes deal funding for a project called 21 22 Honinton (ph), one of our portfolio companies. The deal 23 funding for this project was previously approved by the

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committee in a prior budget, but the money was never spent.

I think it was \$1.3 million that was previously approved.

Our agreement with the committee is that we can spend that \$1.3 million without any further consultation, but the payments in excess of that amount -- and there are -- there is an amount in excess of that in this budget -- cannot be spent without further committee approval or further Court order.

And then if you -- the budget includes a large line item for, you know, in the many millions of dollars, I think it's somewhere close to ten, for the costs of -- the fees incurred in the Euro Log IPO, that as you know was withdrawn, and we have that whole history about -- of those fees.

Although in this budget we've agreed with the committee that those would not be paid unless we have committee approval or again a further order of this Court.

Now, we have been in active discussions with the committee on these fees, which are owed to a number of professionals. They're not debtor professionals so they're not subject to fee applications, but they're -- they're at subsidiary levels, and of course the Euro Log assets, ultimately the value of those assets flows up to the debtors.

And while we hope to received committee approval for payment of some or all of those fees we're not sure if that will be forthcoming.

So what I would like to do is what we've done in the past, which is I don't think we're going to be able to bring this for hearing if this is unresolved at the next omnibus, which is February 20th. What I'd like to shoot for is that we would bring it for hearing on any fees that are unresolved at the March omnibus. I'm not even sure the Court has set a March omnibus, but we would expect it to be set mid to late March.

I think the best course of action is that we spend the next couple of weeks not litigating but continuing our discussions with the committee, and at the same time we can negotiate with the committee a scheduling order so that if litigation has to proceed we can -- we can -- we have an orderly process for that with a goal that things would either be resolved by the March omnibus hearing or unresolved matters could be presented to the Court at the March omnibus.

THE COURT: All right. That sounds like a sensible way to proceed.

So you figure the discussions will essentially probably take place for another three or four weeks and then you'll have the schedule set for briefing after that time to tee up for the March hearing.

MR. ROSENTHAL: Yes, Your Honor. And what I don't want, is I think it's an enormous waste of time for everyone

to, you know, immediately go into a litigation mode when -we've kicked around some solutions, they're not finalized, but we've kicked some solutions, and if we can let them -- I heard the word marinade in a call this morning -- so if we let that marinade for a little while maybe we can come to a conclusion. THE COURT: All right. Certainly I found that procedure has worked well here either to resolve matters or sometimes to narrow them significantly, which is also helpful. So it's always helpful when judges get the benefit of the narrowing before the pleadings are filed as opposed to having pleadings filed and then people show up and say, well, we have a slightly different circumstance, and so it's always helpful for me if that's done in advance. So I'm happy to sign onto a schedule that allows you all to do what you need to do. MR. ROSENTHAL: Fine, Your Honor. And based on that we'd propose the cash management order be entered again as another interim order. THE COURT: All right. Anyone wish to be heard on the cash management order? MR. FLECK: Very briefly, Your Honor. Evan Fleck on behalf of the official committee. I agree with what Mr. Rosenthal said. committee is fine with the approach.

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On the IPO related fees I do think we need we	
need more time. I think the debtors the debtors have	
given thought to ways to come up with an appropriate	
proposal to the committee. The committee I think we	
received the notwithstanding the fact that the IPO was	
pulled some time in November just this past Thursday or	
Friday we got the numbers and so we have some diligence	
requests, and but we do hope, as we did in the last round	
with Linklaters on the same issue or very similar issue, we	
hope to get to a resolution, if not the approach that	
Mr. Rosenthal set out and that I think Your Honor thought	
was appropriate, we agree that it's sensible, and we're	
happy to sign onto that.	
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Anyone else	
wish to be heard on cash management?	
All right, I'm happy to approve the next interim.	
I don't remember which number it is.	
MR. ROSENTHAL: I think it's twelfth.	
THE COURT: Twelfth interim, and I think pretty	
soon you will have set the record, if you have not already.	
Thank you.	
MR. ROSENTHAL: Thank you, Your Honor. And now	
I'll turn it over to Craig Millet for the Tide, Falcon,	
Hopper litigation.	
THE COURT: All right. Let me just share a couple	

of thoughts after reading the papers that maybe can help focus people on -- in their presentation.

I had read a while back and took a look again at the decisions that were issued by the District Court and I think I have a -- the parties did a very good job of explaining exactly factually what's here in front of me and how the different parties of interest interrelate, suffice it to say I think that we really are talking about Falcon, Tide, and Topper. I think that HSBC did a fairly persuasive job of saying it's not our problem, and I wasn't surprised to see that either.

I have a couple of thoughts. Certainly there is a subordination issue as to how you would consider various claims in a bankruptcy forum. But separate and apart from that you have the issue of what is the claim? Is there a claim -- right now there isn't a claim, there's a lawsuit.

It seemed pretty clear from my reading of the District Court's opinion the District Court has spent a significant amount of time parsing through this -- these issues, both the causes of action, the particular causes of action, the pleadings and what their allegations are, as well as additional facts and summary judgments for other issues, particularly the escrows and the conditions of the escrows and various things like that. And I couldn't help but notice that some of those things sort of end up creeping

into the papers that I have in front of me. Which raises an interesting question.

channel the District Court and the conclusions its made thus far as to these issues? That's a bit of a -- sort of a red herring in the sense it's just to demonstrate my concern about litigating the issues the District Court has a firm hand on here. It's not to say that things wouldn't come back here for the core bankruptcy issues about subordination if you get to that. I can certainly see that and I can imagine that -- that the district judge would be not particularly enthused about weighing in on subordination.

But my initial impression, I got to tell you, is to let the district judge do her job and for me to do my job.

Originally when this was all teed up in the summer I understood that the concern was we're not there yet, we need the classic stay argument, we should wait, and that I thought was very persuasive.

Certainly the plan is coming around the corner any day now in light of discussions and the serious progress that's been made, and the escrow is really the -- seems to be the big asset of the Falcon debtors.

So somebody has got to figure out whether this asset does belong to the debtor or whether it belongs to

somebody else, and if so, who has what priority to whoever.

So it no longer seems to be an issue, and people can correct me if I'm wrong, that we should wait in the classic bankruptcy situation saying we should wait because we're not there yet, but rather it seems to be where should we do this?

But I do have a great concern about jumping into a litigation in progress in front of a District Court that has issued not one, but two different opinions that are -- I mean the reconsideration is a fairly short opinion, but the fact that you got a reconsideration decision at all, given what the standards for reconsideration says something about the District Court's thoughtful approach to the issues.

So that's my reaction after reading the papers is that -- and I just wanted to be candid about where I was coming from so parties can address my issues in their presentations -- is that, you know, why doesn't the District Court resolve the underlying disputed issues, that is the claims of Tide with the understanding that Hopper would essentially have a motion to intervene would no longer be opposed, because I don't think you can have it both ways, and then come back to decide the competing issues of the stakeholders and issues of subordination after there's any sort of judgment, but before any funds have been released.

So that's my initial inclination here. And so

with that I'd appreciate any enlightenment, including people telling me that I've got it horribly wrong.

MR. MILLET: Very well, Your Honor. For the record, Craig Millet for the Falcon debtor.

And yes, Your Honor, I'm prepared to address exactly that, because what we're proposing here is not that this Court necessarily take up or take over the liquidation or the allowance of the claim itself, which may be pending in front of the District Court, but that there are clearly important bankruptcy issues that really this Court only can decide, and those should be decided first before we get to those other merits issues as to the fraud claim for several reasons.

One, the most important of which is under some of the authority that we've cited in our papers, that if this claim is in fact subordinated and in fact supersubordinated, if you will, under the U.S.A. Diversified Capital decision that we cited, then there is no need, there will be no need to liquidate the claim, there will be no need for the District Court proceeding at all, or for any reason to have the amount of the claim determined.

We clearly have the subordination issue as the Court mentioned, we have the property of the estate issue, those are intertwined, and we also have Tide asserting by filing a proof of claim a secured claim as to that

\$70 million, but in the District Court telling the District Court it didn't assert a lien.

So now we also have the core issue of this Court determining the nature and extent of the lien that Tide claims.

THE COURT: Right. Well, I understand, and that's why I sort of separated the two issues. And I guess in your view the subordination issue would resolve -- or not would resolve, but as a practical matter might go a long way towards resolving or actually resolve everything else in litigation.

But I guess the other view one could say is, well, if the District Court finds that Tide has no claim then Tide has no claim. In other words, it rejects -- I mean all it had before on that front was a complaint, and looked at 12(b)(6) classic, what's been alleged, has it been properly alleged? Trombley, Iqbal, legal form of particularity it's the sort of standard drill and it's not -- it's not a -- it's not a judgment on what's going to happen when folks put their evidence up, it's a judgment on what does the complaint say and how good a set of lawyers do people have in drafting complaints and recognizing what their requirements are.

So -- but certainly if that -- if those issues are resolved in a way putting aside the escrow, but if the

claims are rejected then I mean it's another way for this whole thing to go away, so.

MR. MILLET: Perhaps, Your Honor, but that's something that is going to be 12 months, 24 months down the road after the expenditure of a tremendous amount of money considering the discovery that needs to be done that has not even been commenced, and we're not going to know the result of that for a long time. And that doesn't really make the subordination go away. Because whether or not the subordination claims and the other claims we've requested be added to the Hopper case or whether they're filed in a separate adversary action, which we could have done and I guess still could do, they're going come to this Court because we need to get this resolved for our plan. Our plan provides for the super-subordination of the claim. It provides for dealing with the security interest. And we want to get those issues resolved.

This Court can deal with those issues without having to get into the merits of the fraud claim, because the allegation here is that whether or not there is a fraud, assuming in fact that fraud is even proven, is this property property of the estate? And that can be determined, we assert and we will prove in our case based the undisputed facts in the case, the occurrence of the escrow breakage trigger and the contents of undisputed agreements, which are

-- the interpretation of which is a question of law for this Court.

THE COURT: Well, go back to what you just said, you were talking about the escrow circumstance. Are you saying that it has to do with whether those conditions have been satisfied?

Again, I'm concerned about the blurring of some of the -- some of the lines and the circumstances to which I'm asked to sort of channel what the District Court may or may not have been thinking.

Certainly there is a request to the District Court to release the escrow, so there was a -- there was a motion made -- and I forget exactly the title of it.

MR. MILLET: There were several. There was a motion for judgment on the pleading. They're all pleadings based motions.

THE COURT: Right. But there was I think originally a motion that said Tide -- a summary judgment motion saying Tide wasn't entitled to a permanent injunction against release of the escrowed funds and then Tide crossmoved for an attachment.

So the District Court has already opined about release of the escrow in connection with the other allegations of the complaint.

So to the extent that -- and this is one of my

concerns -- is what is the argument that you're asking me to look at in connection with the escrow issues? How does it relate, if at all, to what's been in front of the District Court and the District Court's pronouncements? Am I going to run into those? Because it's -- it's a bit of an awkward dance in that context, because there hasn't been any ruling on the merits, but there certainly have been rulings on the litigation, and I don't think one thing, you know, no court wants is to sort of start just doing these things over and over and over again, it doesn't benefit anybody. So how do those two relate?

MR. MILLET: I understand, Your Honor. And all the District Court got into was whether or not at that point Tide could force by essentially a mandatory injunction at that point to sign the escrow instruction and instruct HSBC to release the funds. Even the District Court cited to New York and said, normally when you have a fulfilled escrow the Court is not inclined to get into the issues here.

Here we have the escrow breakage trigger event occurring, everyone agrees that, so we have to look to see if there's some reason to hold this up.

And the Court wasn't making a decision as to whether or not this is property of the estate or whether or not it should be released, but simply said I'm not prepared at this juncture to say that Tide can be forced by an order

to go give the instruction to HSBC that it claims that it's excused from giving. This is strictly a release condition, not an ownership condition. The Court did not get into look into whether or not this is property of the estate.

And we're not asking this Court to make some ruling releasing the property necessarily. We'd like to see it out of HSBC because we're no longer getting interest and we're paying attorneys' fees which is hurting everybody in this case and that's a new event.

THE COURT: Well, I'm sure HSBC would probably be happy to get out of the middle of this.

MR. MILLET: Sure, and we'd be fine with that.

THE COURT: There may be, separate and apart from this, but I'll mention it now so I don't forget, there may be a way that all parties can work out a condition for how the funds should be held that may be more advantageous to all stakeholders, but I'll leave that to you all to think about.

MR. MILLET: But there's nothing in the District
Court opinion that reaches issues of ownership, it strictly
has do with disposition or a release of it. In fact it
appears that the District Court, and even for that matter
Tide, was presuming that at that point the property was
owned by Falcon, but that Tide said, I want to get it back,
I'm entitled to have my ownership revested in me if I prove

fraud. Well, that may or may not have worked under state law, but bankruptcy law has now intervened and have changed the way things work here since that District Court ruling on property of the estate issues and subordination issues and whether or not liens exist are different now that we have bankruptcy law interposed here.

And therefore, the decision that this Court will have to make is even if fraud is proven, even assuming it's proven, based upon what has occurred, that is undisputed, and based upon the undisputed language of two agreements, is this property of the estate?

And then second, assuming it is, assuming the

Court reaches that decision, does fraud change that? Does

fraud mean that somehow title can be revested and passed

back to Tide in that event?

We submit that based upon the pleadings and what

Tide itself has admitted that we'll be able to show that

this property is the property of Tide and -- pardon me -- of

Falcon -- very careful -- of Falcon, and also then that the

claim should be subordinated.

Now, if we get to the super-subordination we're talking about this can be decided on a summary judgment issue by the Court reading the cases and looking at the facts and it'll decide what it decides, but it won't take very long to do that and it won't be very expensive to do

that.

If that does result in the ruling that Falcon seeks then we'll avoid that very expensive litigation and all that discovery and the many, many witnesses and the documents that we're talking about producing and eDiscovery and everything that's going to cost both Tide and Falcon a great deal of money, and in the meantime Falcon's property is tied up in this HSBC escrow so it's going to have difficulty paying its administrative expenses, including paying for its defense of the case.

If we go the cheap route, the quick route, and at least determine whether or not we have subordination and to what level, including super-subordination -- and that intertwines with the property of the estate arguments -- and then also the lien issues, and the Court at least make it is preliminary decision on that, we may be able to avoid the necessary expense of litigation that would otherwise occur in the District Court and get that done quickly.

THE COURT: So in your view the subordination issues do not -- would not run into the merits of the underlying District Court case? I'll use that as a -- sort of a shorthand for the merits of Tide's claim that -- sort of fill in the blank for everything that's in there.

Because my concern is that when I hear the explanation I'm still not sure where the dividing line is.

Because we started out talking about subordination. Saying, well, even if this, that, and the other thing it still goes to the Bankruptcy Court and then we sort of begin to segway into conditions for release of the escrow and things that sound a little like merits arguments.

So if you could give me maybe a little more of a road map as to why or how these things don't -- wouldn't in your mind intersect if the subordination issue moves forward here in the Bankruptcy Court.

MR. MILLET: Under 510(b), Your Honor, we think it's pretty clear that we have a claim arising as a result of the purchase of membership interest of an affiliate of the debtor.

Looking at 510(b) and simply applying that to the clear facts of where this claim came from without regard to whether the claim is based on fraud, a contract, or whatever, it's a claim for damages based upon purchase of a security, here in this case these membership interests, that's to be subordinated under 510(b).

THE COURT: And subordinated here to whom?

MR. MILLET: To all other interests in the case,
including those even equal to the Tide claim under the

U.S.A. Diversified case.

MR. MILLET: That here would be all other claims

THE COURT: And who is that here?

Page 34 1 including Hopper, the Thromson (ph) claims, the tax claims, 2 the employee claims, the general unsecured claims, and even 3 the equity claim that is held by Arcapita itself in Tide -or pardon me -- in Falcon. Excuse me, Your Honor. 4 5 THE COURT: And that's what you're relying on 6 Diversified --7 MR. MILLET: Right. THE COURT: -- the Diversified decision for. 8 9 MR. MILLET: Relying on the Diversified case for 10 that point. So --11 THE COURT: So does it -- so it doesn't matter --12 you're telling me for your analysis it doesn't matter, I 13 don't have to parse the validity of any of those claims, vis-à-vis, Hopper, Tide, I can just simply say that they --14 15 that it's subordinated and therefore that's the end of the 16 issue? 17 MR. MILLET: Well, that's certainly --18 THE COURT: Because I mean my concern is when you say it's subordinated to other claims am I going to run into 19 20 an issue where folks are going to say, well, those claims in 21 fact are contested and they're contested on the basis of the 22 allegations and the lawsuit in District Court and therefore 23 you can't have a subordination because it presumes the 24 validity of these claims, i.e., presumes that Falcon has the

ownership interest, that Hopper has the ownership interest,

and that's exactly what's contested?

MR. MILLET: The ownership of the common stock of Falcon, (indiscernible - 01:44:27) Arcapita is not disputed, it's not at issue in the -- in the District Court case, Hopper's settlement and its right to be paid is not at issue in the District Court case. So those are not disputed.

THE COURT: Well, it's not yet, but they've sought so intervene presumably to put in there word as to -- as to their interest that -- but their interest, as I understand it, and people will correct me if I'm wrong -- presupposes that the money should stay with Falcon because it's essentially saying the money should stay with Falcon and then Falcon gave it to us, this all happened prepetition and therefore it was all valid and therefore it presupposes that Falcon is entitled to the money.

MR. MILLET: Hopper's claim, vis-à-vis, the debtor, is not in dispute in that case. The only thing that would be in dispute is whether Hopper can satisfy that claim by taking a piece of the escrowed money, because it contends that it was absolutely transferred, that piece, if you will, prepetition. We don't dispute Hopper's claim, we do dispute that the actual --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MILLET: -- piece was transferred.

THE COURT: No, I guess the issue more then is it

presupposes Falcon's legitimate right to those funds prepetition, right, and isn't that -- I don't -- again, this is where it becomes a little difficult. I've read the decision of the District Court, I've read both decisions, I have not parsed through the District Court complaint to know what exact legal theories there are or aren't about the escrow and who -- who's -- whether it's seeking damages, whether it's saying those monies never vested in Falcon, whether -- because that involves -- you get dragged into --I'm concerned about being dragged into the merits of what the escrow says and this, that, and the other thing, and I find myself right back to what the District Court has already spent some time trying to figure out, which is what the escrow is and how it operates and who has rights to these funds and what state it existed in. It's almost like -- what is it, Schrodinger's cat, you know, where does it exist in space time at the time of the petition? And so that's what I'm concerned about.

If the argument, the subordination argument presupposes a result on that question and that question is in front of the District Court -- and again, I haven't -- I will not profess to have parsed the District Court complaint so as to understand all the theories on whether this is implicated or not -- but that's my concern.

MR. MILLET: And, Your Honor, if the District

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Court does even make a ruling on this issue as to whether or not the escrow has been (indiscernible - 01:47:08) for release purposes that will not solve the ownership issue.

The ownership or title to those properties is still a separate issue that's before this Court.

And in essence what we're trying to do is get a chance to present those issues to this Court, we think we can do it fast as a matter of law, we can tee it up as quickly as Tide will allow, and at least get a shot at this Court having a chance to look at those and either decide can I rule on these as a matter of law and based upon the facts before me or do I need to get too involved in the District Court proceeding?

Staying this -- or continuing the stay for a short period of time longer while this Court gets at least a chance to have a preliminary look at those issues is really all we're trying to do. Because we believe by putting this before the Court and fully briefing it, as a matter of law , that we can cause the Court to see our point of view here and that we can resolve these issues based upon subordination and other issues, notwithstanding the merits of the fraud claim and have them resolved here.

That short continuance of the stay at this point, considering how long the case has been stayed, it was filed over two years ago, and the fact that it's going to be very

expensive to pursue that case to the debtor and all the parties is unbalanced. Not asking very much. And this Court still would have to deal with subordination, notwithstanding whatever happens over there in the District Court, at least soon, because we're not going to be able to wait for the two years or whatever for that litigation to go on. We would either in the Hopper case, pursuant to our motion for leave to file the third-party claim, or in the separate adversary action, want to tee those claims up before this Court.

THE COURT: Well, this may jump the gun a little bit in terms of plan discussions, but Falcon seems to be in its own sort of unique circumstances. Is the Falcon plan bundled up in a way that it's part -- it has to be resolved at the same time all these other plans do?

I mean I had been led to believe by the papers, and people can correct me if I'm wrong, that really this is the big asset, although there is a claim I guess that -- that Arcapita -- that this debtor has against Arcapita -- I can't remember if it's Arcapita or Arcapita Bank -- and that's the other asset, but that there's no employees, there's no issues, there aren't really a whole lot of claims -- there's some back and forth on that -- but that this is a bit of a stand-alone entity. So -- so what can you tell me about that?

MR. MILLET: It is intertwined, Your Honor, it is in the same plan, it's part and parcel of the same plan, and there is -- there are separate claims filed by Tide against Arcapita Bank in which they assert \$120 million claim, 70 million of which is secured they say as to Arcapita. So we still have that wrapped up in the Arcapita Bank case as well. So that is tied. And so that's one reason we do need to get these issues resolved, and as I suggested, we believe that we can do it fairly quickly on motions. And if the Court looks at those motions and says I can't do it --THE COURT: Well, but if that issue has to get resolved any -- and how is that issue going to get resolved against Arcapita? On the same subordination basis? MR. MILLET: Because we can show that there is no secured claim here pretty easily for one reason, Your Honor, and at least it relegates it to an unsecured claim if there is any claim as to Arcapita Bank. So -- but we think if the Court were to look at this and it were to say, okay, I do need to get into the underlying merits of the fraud case or whatever and therefore I'm not going to do that right now, fine, then it can grant relief from stay and we can let that proceed and go forward, but at least with some parameters or some idea of what the District Court is supposed to do. Because the District Court, even if it does

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liquidate the claim, is not supposed to be deciding issues of ownership of title. This Court may then take whatever the District Court finds --

THE COURT: No, I understand that, and that's why

I'm not -- I'm not supposing that all of these issues would

go to the District Court, because the District Court

wouldn't want all of them frankly, and so subordination is

certainly not something that the District Court would have

in front of it. It doesn't have -- I mean you only lift the

stay as to what's in front of the District Court, and the

District Court doesn't have some of these issues in front of

it. So I'm not supposing that.

MR. MILLET: But Tide says it does.

THE COURT: What I'm trying to figure out is there times when it's appropriate to allow something to get -- essentially to go to a judgment where a District Court has resolved the merits of something and before any assets go anywhere then you come back to the Bankruptcy Court to figure out, all right, well now this has essentially been liquidated, one, liability has been determined, and two, the amount has been liquidated and now it goes back to the Bankruptcy Court to figure out where this fits in if grand bankruptcy scheme.

MR. MILLET: And certainly there are circumstances under which that might be appropriate. This is not one.

Because you can go down the 12 Sonax (ph) factors, if you will, and apply those to this case and tick off each one, and each of those merits maintaining the stay why we at least deal with this -- these important bankruptcy issues.

Because Tide is saying that if we go the District
Court and if the district finds fraud then we own the
property. They've combined those two and have those as a
complete connected matter; they're not separating them.

If this goes back to the District Court now clearly Tide will show to the District Court I have a ruling with the Bankruptcy Court who's agreed with that and has said if you find fraud then Tide owns the estate.

THE COURT: Well, no, I'm not --

MR. MILLET: And subordination is irrelevant.

THE COURT: -- I'm not signing onto that, I'm -my thought is that -- and again, it's sort of a sweat equity
where a Court has spent some time and is familiar with the
issues, and I certainly have spent some time looking at it,
but I won't -- I won't pretend to be as nearly far as
advanced as -- I believe Judge Wood has it?

MR. MILLET: Correct.

THE COURT: So I'm not saying that. I'm saying that it would go to the question of liability and amount on the claim, and then the issue as to what that all means would have to come back to the Bankruptcy Court to parse out

consistent with the priority scheme in the Bankruptcy Code.

MR. MILLET: Recall, Your Honor, Judge Wood has only dealt with the pleadings and taken them at face value for what they say. She's not gotten into the evidence per say.

THE COURT: Well, I know, but there is a substantial analysis set forth in that opinion about everything from securities fraud to common law fraud to (indiscernible - 01:53:13) to various issues that are, you know, right in the District Court's wheel house.

So again, I think my answer might be very different if you had a complaint and you had an answer and you didn't have a whole lot going on, which is oftentimes the situation when these things will present themselves to me and there's really no -- no benefit necessarily to sending it back.

But -- all right. But I think I understand your argument. But correct me if I'm wrong, certainly a very important part, if not sort of the lynchpin of your argument, is about the subordination issues, and I think I have the benefit of some parties, but not all parties', views about subordination. I don't know that I got a response on that particular issue because of the way the different pleadings went forward.

So I think the debtors have given me their view;

Page 43 1 is that correct? But I'm trying to figure out who else has 2 weighed in on subordination. 3 MR. MILLET: No one has despite the opportunity. We moved to be able to file a third-party claim that raised 4 5 the subordination issues, Tide did not object to that, did 6 not even address it. I presume that they agree that under 7 510(b) --THE COURT: All right. 8 9 MR. MILLET: -- there's a major subordination 10 issue and that that has to be dealt with. 11 THE COURT: Well, I think they probably have the 12 view that the whole -- it should go in -- the stay should be 13 lifted and District Court should do what it's doing and therefore we don't even get there, but I may need to hear 14 15 from them on that, we'll see where we end up. 16 MR. MILLET: Very well, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 18 All right. And who wants to weigh in next? You can cast lots or dice or --19 20 MR. ZDUNKEWICZ: Your Honor, David Zdunkewicz again for the Hopper Parties. I'm not sure how Your Honor 21 22 wants to take it. We --THE COURT: Well, let me hear from everybody --23 24 let me do this. Let me hear from everybody who's on one 25 side and then I'll hear from folks on the other side.

Page 44 1 quess you would be --2 MR. ZDUNKEWICZ: Thank you. 3 THE COURT: This would be your time. MR. ZDUNKEWICZ: Your Honor, again, David 4 5 Zdunkewicz with Andres Kurth for the Hopper Parties. 6 You mentioned you haven't read Tide's complaint, 7 but when Your Honor does, and it's Exhibit 2 of Tide's 8 exhibits, they have five claims. 9 The first claim is a fraud and fraud on the 10 inducement claim. For that claim they seek damages, 11 discouragement, and rescission. And rescission of course is 12 specifically mentioned in 510. Their second and third claims are contractual. A 13 breach of warranty and a breach of contract seeking damages 14 15 and attorneys' fees. 16 Fourth claim is a classic 10(b)(5). 17 The fifth claim is a claim for an injunction. 18 Nowhere in their complaint, Your Honor, and nowhere is there any mention of the money is mine, the money belongs to Tide. 19 20 It's nowhere in there. So whatever Judge Wood might said or 21 thought in her rulings there was no pleading before her by 22 Tide seeking title or ownership of the funds. So --23 THE COURT: But seeking the money is an award of damages for its claims. 24 25 MR. ZDUNKEWICZ: Correct. Absolutely.

So I would suggest, Your Honor, not get too tied up in what she said, but you have to look at the claims of Tide. Nowhere in their complaint is there an allegation that that money is mine.

And so we agree with the debtor, Your Honor, that the minute the bankruptcies hit in 2012 the money becomes property of the estate.

Now, we of course have our claim that well the conditions arose prior to all this so that we think a portion of the money is ours, but the point is, Your Honor, there should be really no dispute.

And what I want to I guess get Your Honor's classification a little bit, if I may, if you do lift the stay what is -- what are you lifting it as to? And --

THE COURT: I think it would be for a ruling on the liability on the underlying claims filed by Tide so that I know what claim there is with the intervention of the Hopper claims.

Because again, I think if you're going to do that you've got to do it. Whether it's here or whether it's in the District Court. And then once that claim has been decided on liability and on damages then to come back and figure out what should be paid where.

I think the escrow shouldn't be released if there are arguments about subordination that says that

notwithstanding any claim that is now decided on liability and has been liquidated that it still doesn't get paid, first, second, third, whatever it is, because that would violate the Bankruptcy Code, and I think that's clearly -- one, it's not even in front of Judge Wood so I don't think she could opine on it given what she has in front of her any way, and two, I think if somebody asked her she would -- she would send you on Broadway and tell you to keep walking until you hit this building and go in there and come up to the 7th floor, because she would say that's not my problem, I have enough problems in life, and I think -- I think that that's how the system would work.

So it would -- it would just be as to liability and amount and then it would have to come back here to figure out what the rest of it and how it works in terms of the operation of the Code.

MR. ZDUNKEWICZ: Okay. We want to make that very clear. Because I have a feeling, Your Honor, that based upon the pleadings I've seen from Tide thus far they're going to certainly tell Judge Wood that you have the power to say is it our money or --

THE COURT: Well, if I do lift the stay it would be on those terms, because I think those are the appropriate terms. And you could say in a world without a bankruptcy, all right, you've won say hypothetically, Tide, you've won,

and there are these monies available to satisfy that judgment, and consistent with other law it's appropriate to use those monies that are available to pay the judgment and here's how it all works and that will be fine. But if -- if it is a claim in bankruptcy then it has to be analyzed as part of the Bankruptcy Code as to what that claim is in the priority scheme, how it relates to other claims, and if the money is something that is essentially an asset to satisfy a judgment as opposed to something -- and even if it is, somebody may say, well, the money actually belonged to us before the petition date, certainly the debtors have an interest in it. I mean there are bankruptcy issues to address. And if I sent it on that basis perhaps that doesn't really advance Tide's interest, I don't know, but I don't think that it's appropriate to address the issue of subordination there. I don't think Judge Wood would think it is either. MR. ZDUNKEWICZ: Okay. THE COURT: All right. MR. ZDUNKEWICZ: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. All right, anyone else on that side of the issue? All right, so let me turn it over to the folks who are advocating for lifting the stay and opposing the requests to amend the adversary proceeding.

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Page 48 MR. WOOD: Thank you, Your Honor. Trey Wood on 1 2 behalf of the Tide entities. May I proceed? 3 THE COURT: Sure. MR. WOOD: Your Honor, I had a full presentation 4 to address the Sonax factors. In light of the Court's 5 6 comments, unless you want me to go through those factors, I 7 was going to shortcut it and go directly to the issues 8 presented that the Court has raised. THE COURT: Well, we may get to Sonax at a certain 9 10 point, but I'd appreciate it if you would address the things 11 we've been chatting about, that would probably be more 12 helpful. 13 MR. WOOD: Happy to do that, Your Honor. I will be referring to some of my exhibits, and so 14 15 may I approach the Court to give the Court in case --16 THE COURT: Certainly. I have -- I have the 17 things that were attached to the pleadings in front of me. 18 I actually have Exhibit B-2 open to that, which is the May decision, so, of Judge Wood. So if they're new I'm happy to 19 20 take them, if not I think I have them. 21 MR. WOOD: Your Honor, there may be some new, so 22 just in case may I approach the bench? 23 THE COURT: All right. 24 MR. WOOD: Thank you, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: Obviously if there's anything new that

Page 49 1 other folks haven't seen make sure they've seen this. 2 MR. WOOD: Oh, Your Honor, we exchanged all of this --3 4 THE COURT: All right. 5 MR. WOOD: -- on Monday. 6 THE COURT: All right. 7 MR. WOOD: And we received no objection so far. Your Honor, for the record, can I move -- would it 8 be appropriate if I just moved to the admission of those 9 10 exhibits at this point? 11 THE COURT: Well, is there any objection? 12 MR. MILLET: Well, Your Honor, We really haven't 13 had a chance to review them. A lot of them are simply pleadings, I'm not sure that they're proper to actually 14 15 admit. 16 MR. WOOD: Your Honor can take judicial notice. 17 MR. MILLET: Is it important that they be actually 18 admitted for evidence for purposes of considering this 19 matter? THE COURT: Well, let me -- let me -- let me see 20 if I can shortcut it if there's no quick answer from the 21 22 parties. 23 There was an affidavit of service, I don't think it bears on the merits of it. 24 25 Two is the complaint. I can take judicial notice

Page 50 1 of the complaint. 2 Three is the answer. I can take judicial notice of the answer. 3 Four is also an answer. 4 5 A motion to intervene is Exhibit 5. I think all parties have discussed that. And it's a motion and also a 6 7 complaint and intervention by Falcon Gas Storage. Then there's a Hopper's Parties memorandum of law 8 9 as part of their motion to intervene. 10 Exhibit 6, I will admit that only to the extent that it is relevant for purposes of the positions a party 11 12 may have taken in litigation, not for purposes of really considering those arguments on the merits. It's just -- I 13 14 know there's a distinction there, but it's only relevant to 15 the extent that someone says, well, I took that position 16 with the District Court and someone says, no, you didn't, 17 that's the only reason I care about. 18 MR. MILLET: All of the exhibits are subject, so if that's the condition, Your Honor, then that's fine. We 19 20 just don't want to have admitted --21 THE COURT: Yeah. No, I have pleadings in front 22 of me and people can argue what they want to argue here. I don't know that it's relevant, given what I've heard thus 23 far what people have argued, that there's any dispute about 24 25 what people have argued in front of the District Court such

Page 51 1 that I would have to resort to pleadings to suss that out, 2 but that's what I'm going to take any pleadings in the 3 District Court in connection with. 4 MR. MILLET: And that's fine, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Although I will tell you that I'll 6 probably look first to Judge Wood's first two opinions, and 7 those are in here and obviously I don't think anybody objects to that. 8 9 So let me just flip through it to see if there's 10 anything that's not of a character that we've already 11 discussed. 12 The rest of them I think are pleadings in this Court, which are pleadings in this Court, and so obviously I 13 14 have notice of those. 15 The pleading schedule of assets and liabilities. 16 Statement of financial affairs. Periodic reporting, monthly 17 operating statements. And then I have -- I think that dispenses with 18 everything but Exhibit 21, which is a letter from Gibson, 19 Dunn to counsel for Tide. And so what's the relevance of 20 21 the letter? 22 MR. WOOD: Your Honor, our position -- the Court 23 has already stated on the record that there's really no 24 activity in this bankruptcy case, there's really no

creditor, there's no operation, no other assets, and under

our agreement with the debtor they're required any time they receive an asset or they incur a cost that they notify us.

And that -- the relevance of that is just to show the lack of activity in this bankruptcy, the lack of need of reorganization, which is really the factors --

THE COURT: Well, boy that's a whole -- that's a whole other kettle of fish in terms of reorganization. So I don't want to get -- I don't think I need to go there, so -- and I don't like to generally get into letters back and forth as evidence, because after all it makes all of you witnesses, so I don't think anybody really wants that. I know it's a practice in Bankruptcy Court and lawyers love to do that. If you actually leave New York and you start attaching exhibits to lawyer's declarations most judges in other jurisdictions will scratch their head after they finish yelling at you for submitting a letter in the first place.

So -- so I'm not going to -- I'm not going to take the letter for anything, I think I can suss out what the situation of the debtor is and I don't know that I need to figure that out dispositively for purposes of any of the motions I have in front of me. But --

MR. WOOD: Thank you.

THE COURT: -- I'll take the rest of the documents essentially as either pleadings in this Court or pleadings

Page 53 1 in the District Court which are relevant to the extent that 2 they suss out what the parties' positions are in that court. 3 (Tide's Exhibits were admitted) 4 MR. WOOD: Thank you, Your Honor. May I proceed? 5 THE COURT: Certainly. 6 MR. WOOD: Your Honor, to -- again, focusing on 7 the narrow issue that the Court has asked us to I want to start with the confusion over whether ownership of this 8 9 escrow money is pending before the District Court, and 10 clearly it is. Both Hopper and --11 THE COURT: But in what connection is it? 12 MR. WOOD: And I'm happy --13 THE COURT: There are different kinds of arguments about ownership, right? You say, well, you should pay me 14 15 those money -- and I understood her comment and I was trying 16 to find it but I couldn't find it on the fly --17 MR. WOOD: Your Honor, I'll point it out to the 18 Court. THE COURT: All right. 19 20 MR. WOOD: It's found in their counterclaim. 21 Hopper's counsel comes up here and says it's not in our 22 direct complaint. What the Hopper Parties failed to tell 23 the Court is that after we filed the complaint the debtor 24 filed a counterclaim and we asserted affirmative action -- I 25 mean affirmative defenses to that counterclaim. And it's

actually addressed in the Court's opinion, the September 28th opinion on page 3 of that, and I believe that's one of our exhibits, Your Honor. The opinion is Exhibit 8, Your Honor. And if you go to page 3 on the right-hand side of the column on page 3, now, Judge Wood specifically notes that there's a counterclaim and cross claim number one, seeking a declaratory judgment ordering the disbursement of the funds in the escrow account. Later on on that -- in that same paragraph the Court notes, Falcon's claims -- that Tide asserts that Falcon's claims fail because it's not entitled to enforce the provisions of the agreements procured by fraud. That put the ownership of the escrow monies and Falcon's entitlement into direct play in the District Court. This is further noted in the Court's opinion. I would refer the Court to page 11 of the Court's opinion --Judge Wood's opinion again on the right-hand side column right under Subsection B, Judge Wood notes, "Falcon contends Tide's further performance under the agreements cannot be excused because Tide" --THE COURT: Hold it a second, where are you? MR. WOOD: I'm sorry. THE COURT: I see -- I'm working on --MR. WOOD: Page 11.

THE COURT: -- version that's Exhibit 8.

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Page 55 1 MR. WOOD: It should be page 11 of the opinion. 2 THE COURT: Page 11 right-hand side I see small b. 3 MR. WOOD: The first paragraph. 4 THE COURT: First paragraph. How far down? 5 MR. WOOD: No, just in that first paragraph I'm 6 about to read to the Court. I apologize --7 THE COURT: No, not at all. It's fine. MR. WOOD: -- for going too fast, Your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: What's the first couple of words it 10 says? 11 MR. WOOD: "Falcon contends that Tide's 12 performance -- further performance under the agreements 13 cannot be excused because Tide has already fully performed." 14 And here's the important one, "And" --15 THE COURT: I'm -- but let me -- just so I'm not 16 distracted by finding it, I'm not finding it in the first 17 paragraph under small b. MR. WOOD: Yes, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: So how many sentences in on the right-19 20 hand side, how far down the page of that column should I be 21 looking? 22 MR. WOOD: May I approach the bench? THE COURT: Sure. Because I want to make sure. 23 24 Every once in a while I don't have the --25 MR. WOOD: Oh, I think the Court has the wrong --

Page 56 1 THE COURT: Well, that says page 11. 2 MR. WOOD: That's the --3 THE COURT: That's Exhibit 8. 4 MR. WOOD: Oh, Your Honor, I was working from --5 THE COURT: Oh, you're working -- oh, all right. 6 All right, so let's see. That's why it's always good to 7 figure these things out. So you said Exhibit 8, page 11. I see, that ends up on a different -- ends up on a different 8 column. Okay. All right. So, "Falcon contends ... " All 9 10 right. Proceed, thank you. 11 MR. WOOD: And the important is the latter part of 12 that sentence that says, "Falcon contends the money in the escrow account belong to Falcon as soon as the escrow 13 14 conditions were met." 15 And so the issue of who owns that account and the 16 money therein is plainly in front of the Court, and Judge 17 Wood so notes. She goes on further, if you turn the page, on 18 page 12, paragraph -- I mean footnote 7, Judge Wood --19 20 that's on the left hand -- I mean the left-hand column about 21 three quarters down, footnote 7, Judge Wood again notes that 22 Falcon cites Marriott Court and includes the cite for 23 Marriott Court, and the Court notes, "Falcon cites Marriott 24 Court for the proposition that the escrowed amount" -- and 25 again Judge Wood starts quoting Falcon -- "belong to Falcon

subject only to the satisfaction of the escrow conditions."

Importantly Judge Wood then notes "that as the Court has noted however, the escrow conditions have not been satisfied."

So clearly in Judge Wood's eyes, and properly so, the ownership of this escrow is before her and she so notes in the opinion she's already -- she already has written on this subject.

Why is that relevant? The debtors and Hopper want to create an appearance that there is some type of bankruptcy issue to be decided by this Court, but when you take a closer look at the bankruptcy issues that they're raising, the issue is one, decided by State Court -- excuse me -- state law and not bankruptcy law. And specifically they're claims under 541 and 542, it is fundamental in settled bankruptcy law that in determining what property of the estate is the Court looks to the state law and not bankruptcy law. It also is fundamental law --

THE COURT: Well, but let me ask then the question, because I certainly could do it here. I mean I don't think there's any doubt that this is not some sort of a Stern versus Marshall issue, I think I certainly would have jurisdiction to have all these things here just as obvious Judge Wood has jurisdiction for all things that are in front of her.

So in your mind why should it be in the District
Court as opposed to the Bankruptcy Court if Bankruptcy
Courts decides all the time what's property of the estate
and what's not?

MR. WOOD: Well, for the reasons the Court has already noted. Is what they really want you to do is revisit the holdings that Judge Wood has already made.

And specifically -- and I'll cite the Court to In re: Royal Business School, Inc., it's 157 B.R. 932, it's an Eastern District of New York bankruptcy case of 1993, that involved turnover under 541 and 542 of escrow funds. And in there the Eastern District notes that one, that you have to look to state law to determine whether it's property of the estate. Two, the established law that the estate takes no greater interest in property after the filing than the debtor had prior to the filing. And then the Court goes on to note that under New York law legal title does not transfer until conditions for the escrow have been satisfied. And therefore under -- most courts have interpreted that under New York law escrow accounts are not property.

Now, this is important, because in going back to Judge Wood's opinion she agrees with that and she's already ruled that.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you who --

Page 59 1 MR. WOOD: And so --2 THE COURT: -- if in your view the escrow conditions have not been satisfied and therefore doesn't 3 belong to Falcon who does it belong to? 4 5 MR. WOOD: It belongs to Tide. That is --6 under --7 THE COURT: And what's your basis for that? 8 MR. WOOD: Because we were the grantor, we created 9 that, the money came from us, and that's what New York law 10 says, is that if you -- if you cannot satisfy the conditions 11 of the escrow it will go back, the title never transfers. 12 That's our position. 13 That's why and to their counterclaim and Judge Wood, that's why when they asserted we are entitled to these 14 15 proceeds, to these funds that we own these funds we 16 countered as an affirmative defense, no, you do not, because 17 you cannot enforce the contract because of your fraud. And that's what Judge Wood agreed with us on a summary judgment 18 basis. I'll recognize that. 19 20 But Judge Wood has already ruled that the instrument -- the instructions -- their position in District 21 22 Court was hey, the conditions have been met. Judge Wood said, no, they haven't all been met, you had to give joint 23 24 instructions and you haven't done that. And then they said,

well, that's just ministerial, Tide doesn't have to perform

-- I mean Tide should perform, please make them perform.

They sued us for breach of contract and asked for summary judgment on that issue and she said, no, they have presented a prima facie case of fraud, and so therefore you cannot make Tide give those instructions.

And so that's why -- that's the intersection the Court was asking about to determine whether this is property of the estate, and that's what they're asking you to do in this -- in this amended complaint that they want to file in the Hopper adversary. They want the Court to determine that's property of the estate.

Under Royal Business School to do that you have to go to state law, and the Court is going to have to determine the same issues that Judge Wood has already decided. You're going to have to bring that money into this estate without trying our fraud claims, you are going to have to overrule Judge Wood because she's already spoken that if -- in order for the debtor to get these funds you must first try the fraud claims.

THE COURT: Well, I'll -- let me just sort of set forth how I see what's in front of the District Court, and folks can correct me if I'm wrong, is that the escrow funds are their own particular argument, right? The escrow funds are -- there are conditions that have to be satisfied for certain things to happen, and so that's its own sort of

inquiry, and that's certainly something that I'm very worried about the intersection of bankruptcy with the opinions that exist.

Again, they're not on the merits, they're on what was presented to Judge Wood. Saying there's enough evidence to go to trial on this for summary judgment purposes.

about claims that really are just for award of damages, and that's -- so there's not the same worry about the intersection, I think, they're claims, and they're not liquidated, nobody knows whether there's liability or the amount. But certainly -- and the liability on one though obviously is hinged directly with the liability on the other. So, all right.

So in your view the escrow conditions and whether they've been satisfied are not -- would tell me whether this should be property of the estate as of the time of the bankruptcy filing.

MR. WOOD: That's exactly right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WOOD: The -- let me address quickly the subordination argument. The subordination argument doesn't apply to whether it's property of the estate, and that's the first issue. I think the Court is correct, that's the first issue that we've got to decide. Whose property this is and

is the debtor entitled to it? That's pending before Judge Wood, it's been pending before Judge Wood for two and a half years, she's issued two substantive opinions on that issue. That's what we would go up there and try.

If Judge Wood says there's no fraud, they're entitled to the escrow funds we would come back to this Court, she would also rule on whatever other claims we would have, and then the Court is correct, we would come back here and disburse whatever is property of the estate.

At that time we could address the 510 issues. The 510 issues does not come into play in determining whether it's property of the estate. The reason that is, is because 510 is very specific on its face. It reads for purposes of distribution our claims are subordinated.

And for the record we're not admitting that it's subordinated at all, but for the sake of the argument, we're saying even if they're correct that we are subordinated then it's only subordinated for distribution. That preproposes (sic) that there is something to be disbursed. Judge Wood says you can't force us, can't -- Judge Wood says, Falcon, you can't force Tide to give those instructions if they have a fraud claim. 510 doesn't say Tide you must give those instructions. It does not -- it does not say that. It says for distribution. It doesn't say for any other purposes.

So --

Page 63 1 THE COURT: And your view is distribution 2 presupposes property of the estate. MR. WOOD: Yes. Yes. 3 And finally, Your Honor, on the -- the other 4 5 reason why 510 should be heard afterwards. 6 The Court asked the exact right question early on, and that question is, who are we going to be subordinated 7 to? And that's why we attached the schedules and statement 8 9 of financial affairs. 10 There is nobody else out there to be subordinated. If -- because of where our claim fits we have a claim 11 12 arising from the sale of an affiliate of the debtor, a 13 wholly-owned subsidiary. 14 The super-subordination of U.S. Commercial 15 Mortgage dealt with sale of the debtor's equity. 16 So I would agree that if we were dealing with sale 17 of the debtors' equity there might be an issue of super-18 subordination. We are not. THE COURT: When you say debtor you mean Arcapita 19 20 as opposed to Falcon. 21 MR. WOOD: I'm talking -- no, Falcon. 22 THE COURT: Okay. MR. WOOD: We -- our claim does not arise --23 24 Falcon is the debtor -- our claim does not arise from the 25 sale of Falcon's equity, and that's what happened in U.S.

Commercial Mortgage that they cite. It involved claims arising from sale of the debtor's LLC interest. And so they were structurally subordinated, and they correctly said that you are super-subordinated.

Why that's relevant in this case is because the -if you look at their schedules there's only two other groups
that -- other than Tide that is in this case. One is
Hopper. Who is Hopper? Hopper is equity of the debtor.
Their claims arise from being a shareholder of the debtor.
Their claims --

THE COURT: Well, I suspect they may disagree with you about that characterization, because I think they're separate -- I mean there's classic equity claims. I own equity and therefore I -- you know, but this I understand is a separate lawsuit which led to a separate escrow and then led to various other things. So they sued as I guess its minority owners of -- here, but I don't think that that means that they have the classic equity ownership.

MR. WOOD: But their claim -- if the Court is correct on that argument their claim arises out of the same sale that we have a claim about. They -- we were complaining that we got defrauded, we paid too much. They were complaining that they got defrauded, you paid too little.

So if our claim is subordinated their claim is

subordinated. And so at best for Hopper there's going to be a pari passu distribution. So there is no super-subordination in this case.

The only other group that the debtor has scheduled is employee stock option claims. In Enron and other cases in this district said those too are subordinated under 510. We take the position that they should be super-subordinated to us. I understand the Court is not willing to make that ruling today. But again, at best they're going to share pari passu.

The answer to that question is our fraud claim is not going to go away. The suggestion that we first deal with the subordination argument is putting the cart before the horse. It's -- we're talking about wasted money, that's going to be a complete waste of money.

What we need to first do is determine who owns this. That's pending before Judge Wood. Then we can come back, if there's anything to be disburse, then we can come back and fight over where that money should go.

And I respectfully disagree with the Court -- with their assertion that there is any kind of super-subordination for our claims.

And I'd like to, because I haven't had an opportunity to brief that issue, I would like to refer the Court to two cases just briefly. It's VF Brands, Inc., 275

B.R. 725, it is a Bankruptcy Court in Delaware, a 2002 decision. And then Wisconsin Barge Line, Inc., 76 B.R. 142, bankruptcy of Eastern District of Missouri 1987.

The relevance of those two cases, Your Honor, is those two cases dealt with the sale of a wholly-owned subsidiary of the debtor. And what did those two cases say? They said, yes, you may be subordinated to general unsecured creditors, but you are not super-subordinated to equity. That is -- and those cases are distinguishable from U.S. Commercial Mortgage that dealt with the super-subordination, because -- and those two cases I cited to the Court -- they dealt with sale of a wholly-owned subsidiary of the debtor versus U.S. Commercial Mortgage that dealt with sale of the debtor's stock.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WOOD: Your Honor, for those reasons we agree with the Court that the stay should be lifted to allow the District Court to proceed and then we can come back to this Court at a later date and decide if there is anything to disburse how that should be disbursed.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you two questions on details.

Is it -- what's your position on the Hopper

Parties' motion to intervene in the District Court? I know

the parties took various positions quite a while and a lot

has happened since then. So what's your position now on that?

MR. WOOD: Your Honor, we have agreed -- that's one of the reasons we admitted Exhibit 7, which was our reply to the objections to our motion to lift stay. I admitted that -- or offered that for the sole purpose of showing that we have judicially admitted that we will withdraw our opposition to their motion to intervene and allow them to participate.

THE COURT: All right.

And when you talk about what should happen in the District Court I just want to be very clear what position you're advocating. So if you would be so kind just to state it again.

You're saying that the stay should be lifted so that the District Court can decide whether the escrow -- who the escrow belongs to and would just tie it up with the conditions being met, and may -- appears to, but may not necessarily be tied up with the underlying fraud claim. And -- but you are not proposing that any money be awarded -- I'm sorry -- be paid, including money paid out of the escrows, until it comes back to the Bankruptcy Court to decide the -- how the District Court's rulings would apply in the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code as to other complaints in the bankruptcy and other entities in the case.

MR. WOOD: Yes, Your Honor. We -- I believe that's correct. We propose that we do liquidate our claims, our fraud claims up in District Court. So she will determine what our claims are, the amount of the claims. She will determine their -- Falcon's counterclaims that they're entitled to the proceeds.

So if we win our hope is that she will issue an opinion that says, Falcon, you are not entitled to those proceeds, those proceeds or those escrow funds belong to Tide.

If the Court is saying we don't enforce that order until we come back here for further relief from the stay I don't have an opposition to that, I'm happy to come back.

But I think there may be ramifications from the Court's ruling if she says you have no interest -- Falcon has no interest in these funds then we'll come back to this Court and say that.

THE COURT: Well, I mean one of the things that is always in this overlap of courts is that a Court doesn't know exactly how it's going to play out in the other court, and there's too many permutations to say, well, if this happens then we should do this. I'm not -- I will not profess to be smart enough to write that flowchart.

So my view is that since there's certainly a significant number of outcomes would require further action

by the Bankruptcy Court to determine what should happen I would say that in any event it should come back here before anybody goes anywhere. And if the answer is, well, it's plain as day, Your Honor, it says right here X, Y, and Y it's not property of the estate, and you know, if it's we need an order then so be it. If it's clear as day -- the debtors get up and say it's clear as day, because right here it says I reject all the fraud claims now that we've had a trial and the conditions of the escrow are satisfied, it's all ours, and therefore, you know, this should happen.

It may be very plain to one party or the other what the outcome is, but I don't think that it's very wise to -- for me to try to forecast that now, and I think it would make all parties very nervous as to how things could be construed, because they say, well, does this mean that or -- sometimes minor changes in wording can lend people to have serious anxiety attacks as you're afraid of assets being moved somewhere and once they're gone they may be gone.

So, but what I hear you saying is that you don't have any opposition to an approach whereby any -- no money goes anywhere until folks come back to the Bankruptcy Court and decide what the impact of any District Court ruling is on the escrow funds and really anything else relating to the estate.

Page 70 MR. WOOD: That's correct, Your Honor. 1 2 THE COURT: All right. 3 MR. WOOD: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. 4 5 All right, anyone else on that side of the issue 6 who wants to be heard? 7 MR. VAN TOL: Well, Your Honor, Pieter Van Tol for HSBC --8 9 THE COURT: I guess you're on no side of the 10 issue. 11 MR. VAN TOL: I'm on no side, Your Honor. Good 12 afternoon, Your Honor, Pieter Van Tol from Hogan Lovells for 13 HSBC. As the Court noted, HSBC just wants out of this 14 15 matter; however, we want to make sure that whatever exit we 16 have is an effective one. 17 I think the -- I heard the Court mention a 18 consensual arrangement. We are certainly amenable to that, and I think that's probably the best way forward is to work 19 20 with the parties to maybe amend the escrow agreement. 21 But I wanted to speak to the Court in the event that that doesn't work, and if it doesn't work we're going 22 23 to have to seek interpleader relief. 24 Now, I think if we're in the District Court we're 25 able to do so because the pleadings are properly framed.

Pg 71 of 85 Page 71 1 Our issue, Your Honor, is a very limited one. 2 THE COURT: You want to deposit the funds and be done with it. 3 MR. VAN TOL: And be done with it. But the 4 5 problem is if we're in Bankruptcy Court, Your Honor, we 6 don't believe Falcon has pled a case in controversy, it's 7 not properly pled. 8 So the last thing that HSBC wants to happen is 9 interpleader relief granted and then there's an allegation 10 later on appeal that there was never jurisdiction. 11 So I have a simple solution, Your Honor, which is 12 in Exhibit 3 in your binder, which is the -- contains the 13 answer of Falcon. They asserted a cross-claim, and what 14 they did, Your Honor, is they asked for two things. One was 15 a declaration that they get the money, because there was the 16 controversy between Falcon and Tide. The second cause of 17 action was a breach of contract. In neither one of those causes of action was HSBC 18 alleged to have done anything wrong. HSBC was included 19 20 simply as --21 THE COURT: Of it being at the wrong place at the 22 wrong time. 23 MR. VAN TOL: Exactly, Your Honor. HSBC was a nominal defendant. 24

I think that's how this case should be pled if it

goes forward in the Bankruptcy Court.

Our issue with the current pleading is Falcon is alleging that we have an issue with them about whether or not the escrow funds are property of the estate. We have no such issue, Your Honor. There's no -- there's no debate, we're neutral. And that's it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. VAN TOL: That's solely to note that if we go forward here we'd like the pleading to be amended so we can get effective relief.

THE COURT: Here's what I'd like to do is I'm going to make up my mind about what to do with this case and this particular set of motions. In the meantime I'll ask the parties who have separately and independently, if they with work something out, it may be that -- it sounds like there's no interest being accrued, and may be in the benefit of all parties to try to work out some sort of other arrangement that is mutually beneficial wherever the funds end up and that will get your client out, because I'm sure any -- there's really no benefit for your client in the current circumstance. So folks can work on that.

If -- I think if I lift the stay to let it go back to the District Court under the circumstances that we've discussed then I think it may be as simple as a stipulation to deposit the funds in the District Court. If it stays

here my goal would be to resolve your concerns, if we can, as quickly as possible, meaning at the next omnibus.

So let me -- let me try to figure out what I'm going do. I have a thought, but I want to think it over a little bit more. But we're not going let your issue linger to the extent it can be resolved.

MR. VAN TOL: Thank you very much, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

MR. MILLET: Briefly, Your Honor.

Tide has certainly informed everyone here in the courtroom that it truly believes the ownership issue is pending before the District Court, and therefore, whatever is decided there will decide the ownership. So in essence it's saying the District Court is going to be deciding the property of the estate issue. Again, we think that's an important issue that should be decided here.

But in saying so just based upon simply the fraud allegations or simply proving fraud, many creditors come into bankruptcy cases and file fraud claims and then want to say that because it's fraud as opposed to breach of contract I have a superior right of recovery or I have a right to rescind or pull back what I gave you, and that's in effect what's happening here. So --

THE COURT: Well, the problem you have is one of a pending federal District Court action where a Court has

already spoken twice on the issues. And if I keep it here what do I do with those pronouncements? They're not on the merits, but there are certain pronouncements, and a couple of which have been point the out here, particularly the one about the escrow requirements have not been satisfied and therefore this is -- this is my view as a judge.

What I hear you saying is that that may be a little out of whack with what's been pled, but it's there nonetheless. What -- so what do I do with it?

And so it's always a bit awkward when you have that overlap, and it's not particularly judicially efficient for me to start -- I can't start from square one I don't think, and I do run the risk of -- and I think it's a jeopardy not only to a Court but also to the parties.

Because one thing that the parties don't want is uncertainty, and to the extent that I start wading into things where there have already been certain -- there are already certain icebergs out there of things that I might run into inadvertently that's an appellate lawyer's dream. Someone will say, well, you know, sort of had that right but there's this language that says this and the judge shouldn't have done that any way.

Clearly I have jurisdiction to decide what's property of the estate, but at the end of the day between that problem and the problem of what additional value do I

add -- because that's a question I always ask myself in the circumstances -- I'm not sure on this particular issue I do add any value where a Court is certainly much further in front of me in resolving those issues.

I'm not construing the arguments here to be open season on folks coming into Bankruptcy Court and say, well, this claim and that claim are fraud and to tie up the system. I don't think that that's something that is at all what I mean. I'm just looking at the facts and circumstances here and I don't know that there's a good answer as to how to construe that.

Because, I mean, how would you have me construe
that line in the opinion that says -- I think it was pointed
out by Tide's counsel -- that says Falcon cites Marriott
Court for the proposition that the escrowed amount belongs
to Falcon subject only to satisfaction of the escrow
conditions. As the Court has noted however the escrow
conditions here have not been satisfied.

And what -- what would you have me do with that particular language is my -- is the question?

MR. MILLET: Clearly, Your Honor, the Court was distinguishing a case there and was not looking at it for purposes of release, it was not looking at the entire factual pattern and saying whether or not it was relevant, even whether that specific issue had been completed or that

specific instruction had been given. It wasn't saying therefore I find that unless this condition is met --

THE COURT: Well, but then --

4 MR. MILLET: -- title must go, title does not pass.

THE COURT: And again, there's always an issue as to what a Court says and the procedural context it says it, but when it says the Court has noted the escrow conditions here have not been satisfied. Nothing has changed between now and then. And it appears that in other parts of the opinion that there -- the Court is saying that, well, the instructions need to be given, you've asked me to order them to give the instructions, I'm refusing to do so because of the fraud issue, and therefore is fraud issue is therefore that big impediment, and that's certainly law of the case in the District Court.

so is this like a situation where it's a removal and I take the case where it is? I mean or do I ignore that? I mean I -- you know, that's the problem and that also tells me juris prudentially that starting from square one and looking at issues, such as the escrow, that I do run the risk of -- you know, I think that the fact that I'm worried about running into this sort of language in the various findings of the District Court and various conclusions that she's reached thus far on the things before

her sort of I think councils me to have cautious as to going ahead here on those exact same issues.

MR. MILLET: I understand, Your Honor. My point is the Court there did find that that final event had not occurred. We'd stipulate to that. Our point is that is not a necessary element of causing title to transfer to Falcon. That not only did it transfer under the escrow instructions but also under the express language of the escrow Tide acquired title -- pardon me, I did it again -- Falcon acquired title to the escrowed money upon the closing of the transaction, and that's what we would prove there.

I don't -- I'm concerned that this ruling that you're about to make would be portrayed to the District Court as this Court agreeing that if fraud is simply proven ownership is also resolved.

THE COURT: No, first of all I think the word proven is wrong. It's a 12(b)(6) motion as to whether the complaint there satisfied the allegations, and that's -- you know, that's a standard thing, and they always -- those rulings always come across as unduly -- like an undue hardship on the party who's the defendant because it makes it sounds like something has been proven. Nothing has been proven. Something has been pled. So I'll make that absolutely clear. It's just -- but that's what happens. You take all the allegations as true and you look to see

whether it's been properly pled.

And the only thing that I understand the Court then to do on the summary judgment issues, which dealt with escrow, is to say, well, there's an impediment given the pleadings that I have here that are well pled to me taking that step, which is part and parcel of the ultimate resolution of the case.

And so she doesn't say it, but I think it's fairly implied, that she would say to both parties you may be right, you may be wrong, we just don't know yet.

So I'm not -- to the extent that my comments or anything I do here could remotely be construed as saying that I think anyone has committed fraud I will -- just for the record I will categorically reject that.

Again, it's just -- it is a -- the language is a function of the pleading and the procedural posture that the -- that that case is in. But it does mean that that Court has spent significant time and has said various things in connection with the motions that it had. So --

MR. MILLET: One last question, Your Honor, and I'll sit down.

Assuming the Court does make the ruling that relief from stay is granted, does that mean that Falcon is precluded from filing a separate action with respect to subordination? Or maybe better put, would the Court be

distressed to see us proceed and try to deal with the subordination issue as well as the -- this court action is --

THE COURT: Well, I'm concerned about what I could actually do. Because if the question is about ownership of who owns the asset and whether it's property of the estate, subordination I understand goes to payment of -- of an asset of the estate out and who gets in and in what order. So -- and that's why I think my questions to you when you first came up were in that nature about the intersection of these issues.

So distress may be too strong a word, because I certainly understand that to the extent that this for Falcon presents, you know, an impediment to the bankruptcy case going forward, I understand your desire to move things along. But I don't know that there's anything I can do until we have an understanding of what that issue -- what the outcome is of that issue.

So I don't make a habit of telling people they can't file things --

MR. MILLET: I understand.

THE COURT: -- because sometimes folks that may have a more -- a more developed position than they've been able to present and changes my mind.

But sitting here right now I have trouble

imagining that that's a beneficial exercise until we know whether these funds are property of the estate.

MR. MILLET: Very well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So, anything else?

MR. MILLET: No, that's it.

THE COURT: All right. Let me ask one question of all the parties. I do before I make a ruling, and you can tell I certainly am leaning a particular way, the issue of subordination was not completely briefed, and I don't want to brief it in a way that will essentially have us conduct the proceedings that one side is advocating versus the other side, but I would like a short statement from Tide on subordination just so Tide has the opportunity, not more than ten pages, and I'll give the debtors an equal opportunity to file a reply, no more than ten pages.

I think I've got the gist from -- from the arguments here today. There were some citations to cases that I just want to -- that's really the point of the pleading is just so I get a chance to get the benefit of your thinking about how the cases are relevant.

As you can tell I do have a lean as to what I'm thinking of doing, but I just want to make sure that issue is fully vetted as it -- I think is sort of a lynchpin of the debtors' argument here.

So if I could get those -- I don't want them -- I

Page 81 1 want to have them fairly soon. So when would Tide be 2 comfortable filing a short pleading on that issue? 3 MR. WOOD: A week from Friday? Is that enough time? 4 5 THE COURT: That would be fine. And the debtors 6 for a response? 7 MR. MILLET: A week thereafter. THE COURT: That would be fine. And then what I'd 8 9 like to do is remind me when our omnibus is in February? 10 MR. ROSENTHAL: The 20th, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: The 20th. All right. That will be 12 the outside date for me ruling on this. If I'm in a position to give you a ruling, and I don't think that a 13 14 written opinion will add any value, which is my current 15 thinking, I may call you all up and just say I'm going issue 16 a decision from the bench and folks can make themselves 17 available and we'll pick a date before the 20th. 18 My ability to do that is going depend on some other things going on in the courthouse, but I have -- I 19 20 understand that delay is not a good thing. So if I can get 21 it done sooner than the 20th I will -- I will do that. 22 All right. Thank you. MR. ROSENTHAL: Your Honor, before we adjourn I 23 24 can just make sure that the record is clear that you have so 25 ordered the extension of exclusivity until the 28th?

	Page 82						
1	Because you'll be filing the order after the						
2	THE COURT: Yes, absolutely. If I guess we						
3	have a bridge order through the hearing today						
4	MR. ROSENTHAL: Correct.						
5	THE COURT: it is so ordered that exclusivity						
6	is extended and I will enter an order that removes all						
7	doubts as quickly as I can.						
8	MR. ROSENTHAL: Thank you, Your Honor.						
9	THE COURT: Thank you very much.						
10	(Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 1:02 PM)						
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Page 85 CERTIFICATION I, Dawn South, certify that the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. AAERT Certified Electronic Transcriber CET**D-408 Veritext 200 Old Country Road Suite 580 Mineola, NY 11501 Date: January 17, 2013