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1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
3	Case Nos. 12-11076-shl
4	x
5	In the Matter of:
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7	ARACAPITA BANK B.S.C.(c), et al,
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9	Debtors.
10	
11	x
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13	U.S. Bankruptcy Court
14	One Bowling Green
15	New York, New York
16	
17	May 7, 2012
18	11:00 AM
19	
20	BEFORE:
21	HON SEAN H. LANE
22	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
23	
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Page 2 1 Hearing re: Docket. #12 (FINAL) Motion to (A) Authorizing 2 Debtors to (I) continue Existing Cash Management System, 3 Bank Accounts, and Business Forms and (II) Continue Ordinary 4 Court Intercompany Transactions; and (B) Granting an 5 Extension of Time to Comply with the Requirements of Section 6 345(b) of the Bankruptcy Code 7 8 Hearing re: Doc. #23 Motion to authorize Debtors Motion for 9 Interim and Final Orders (A) Authorizing Debtors to Pay 10 Certain Prepetition Claims of Critical and Foreign Vendors; 11 and (B) Authorizing Financial Institutions to Honor and 12 Process Related Checks and Transfers 13 Hearing re: Doc. #24 Motion to Authorize Debtors Motion for 14 15 Entry of Interim and Final Orders Authorizing the Debtors to 16 (A) Pay Certain Prepetition Wages, Salaries, and 17 Reimbursable Employee Expenses, (B) Pay and Honor Employee 18 Medical and Similar Benefits, and (C) Continue Employee 19 Compensation and Employee Benefit Programs 20 21 Hearing re: Doc. #25 Motion to Authorize Debtors Motion for 22 Interim and Final Orders (A) Authorizing the Debtors to 23 Continue Insurance Coverage Entered into Prepetition and to Pay Obligations Relating Thereto; and (B) Authorizing 24

Financial Institutions to Honor and Process Related Checks

Page 3 1 and Transfers 2 Hearing re: Doc. #46 Application to Employ Trowers & 3 Hamlins LLP as Bahraini Counsel -- Debtors' Application 4 5 Pursuant to Sections 327(e) and 328 of the Bankruptcy Code 6 for an Order Authorizing the Debtors to Retain and Employ 7 Trowers & Hamlins LLP as Bahraini Counsel Nunc Pro Tunc to 8 the Petition Date 9 10 Hearing re: Doc. #47 Application to Employ Alvarez & Marsal 11 North America, LLC as Financial Advisors Debtors' 12 Application for Interim and Final Orders Approving the 13 Employment and Retention of Alvarez & Marsal North America, LLC as Financial Advisors to Debtors and Debtors in 14 15 Possession 16 17 Hearing re: Doc. #48 Motion to Approve Motion for Order 18 Establishing Procedures for Interim Compensation and 19 Reimbursement of Expenses for Professionals and Committee 20 Members 21 22 Hearing re: Doc. #49 Motion to Authorize Debtors Motion for 23 an Order Pursuant to Sections 105(a), 327, 328 and 330 of the Bankruptcy Code Authorizing Debtors to Employ and Retain 24 25 Certain Professionals Utilized in the Ordinary Course of the

Page 4 1 Debtors Business 2 3 Hearing re: Doc. #51 Application to Employ Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP as Debtors Counsel Debtors Application for an 4 5 Order approving the Employment and Retention of Gibson, Dunn 6 & Crutcher LLP as Counsel for the Debtors In Possession Nunc 7 Pro Tunc to the Petition Date 8 9 Hearing re: Doc. #52 Motion to Authorize Debtors Motion for 10 Order Authorizing Parties to File Under Seal Names of the 11 Debtors Customer 12 13 Hearing re: Doc. #90 Motion t Extend Time Debtors Motion 14 for an Order Further Extending the Time to File Reports of 15 Financial Information Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 16 Procedure 2015.3(a) 17 Hearing re: #91 Motion to Extend Deadline to File Schedules 18 19 or Provide Required Information Debtors Motion for Entry of Order Further Extending the Time to File Schedules and 20 21 Statements of Financial Affairs 22 23 Hearing re: #92 Application to Employ Linklaters LLP as 24 Special Counsel -- Debtors' Application Pursuant to Sections 25 327(e), 328(a), and 330(a) of the Bankruptcy Code for an

Page 5 Order Authorizing the Debtors to Retain and Employ Linklaters LLP as Special Counsel Hearing re: Doc. #95 Motion of Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft for Entry of an Order Granting Limited Relief from the Automatic Stay Transcribed by: Dawn South

Page 6 1 APPEARANCES: 2 GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 3 Attorneys for the Debtors 4 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166-0193 5 6 7 BY: MICHAEL A. ROSENTHAL, ESQ. 8 MATTHEW KELSEY, ESQ. 9 JANET M. WEISS, ESQ. 10 11 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 12 Attorney for the United States Trustee 13 33 Whitehall Street, 21st Floor New York, NY 10004 14 15 16 BY: RICHARD MORRISSEY, ESQ. 17 18 MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & MCCLOY LLP 19 Attorneys for the Official Creditors' Committee 20 One Chase Manhattan Plaza 21 New York, NY 10005-1413 22 23 BY: DENNIS F. DUNNE, ESQ. 24 EVAN R. FLECK, ESQ. 25

Page 7 1 CLIFFORF CHANCE US LLP 2 Attorney for Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft 3 31 West 52nd Street 4 New York, NY 10019-6131 5 6 BY: RICK B. ANTONOFF, ESQ. 7 8 DECHERT LLP 9 Attorney for Standard Charter 1095 Avenue of the Americas 10 11 New York, NY 10036-6797 12 13 BY: BRIAN E. GREER, ESQ. 14 15 ALSO PRESENT: 16 17 LAWRENCE HIRSCH 18 ART ROGERS 19 RICHARD GOOD (TELEPHONIC) 20 STEVEN KOTARBA (TELEPHONIC) 21 22 23 24 25

Page 8 PROCEEDINGS 1 2 THE CLERK: All rise. 3 THE COURT: Good morning, please be seated. All 4 right, we're for Arcapita Bank. Proceed. 5 MR. ROSENTHAL: Good morning, Your Honor, Michael 6 Rosenthal with Matt Kelsey, Janet Weiss from Gibson, Dunn & 7 Crutcher on behalf of Arcapita Bank and it's debtor 8 affiliates. 9 THE COURT: All right. Let me --10 MR. ROSENTHAL: With me also --11 THE COURT: -- just get -- you have other introductions? 12 13 MR. ROSENTHAL: Yes, with me --14 THE COURT: All right. 15 MR. ROSENTHAL: -- also today is Lawrence Hirsh 16 from Alvarez & Marsal and Art Rogers who is the director of 17 legal with Arcapita Bank. 18 MR. DUNNE: Good morning, Your Honor, Dennis Dunne from Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy on behalf of the 19 Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, and with me is my 20 partner, Evan Fleck. 21 22 MR. MORRISSEY: Good morning, Your Honor, Richard 23 Morrissey for the U.S. Trustee. 24 THE COURT: All right, good morning to you all. 25 MR. ROSENTHAL: Your Honor, I have a few

introductory remarks to bring the Court up to date with what's been happening and then we can go into the motion if that's okay.

First, I hope you received your chart with the larger text size.

THE COURT: I did. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. Again, I'm limiting denial that my eyes are getting worse every day, but I'm happy to get the assist.

MR. ROSENTHAL: I think we all appreciate the larger chart.

Your Honor, we've had a very productive three weeks since the -- since the last hearing. We've spend a great deal of time in discussions with the joint provisional liquidators and the committee advisors about the issues that are of most importance in the early days of this case, including the reduction enforce program that we're -- that we're drafting now, the protocol that we continue to draft with each of the committee and the joint provisional liquidator, deal funding issues, we've heard Lou Sale (ph) mentioned, we've had discussions about Lou Sale.

I think, Your Honor, we've established a very frank working relationship with the committee and the JPLs, and notwithstanding the little dust up we had with the committee related to some of the motions that were up today, which I'm happy to report were resolved in discussions late

1 last night and right before the hearing this morning. 2 THE COURT: The papers had the look of something 3 that was in the middle of discussions, so I'm happy to hear 4 that. It was a fascinating read on Sunday, but it was 5 nonetheless -- I was cautiously optimistic you would --6 MR. ROSENTHAL: Yes, we hoped we could have 7 resolved it before you had to read them, but --8 THE COURT: That's all right, that's what I'm here 9 for. 10 MR. ROSENTHAL: In any event, we believe that the 11 production -- that the discussions have been very positive 12 and cooperative. 13 I've given you a report on budgets and where we --14 where we have been over the past I guess five or six weeks. 15 Just a couple pieces of information. 16 From the filing of the case, which was March 19th 17 through April 28th we were budgeted to spend a net of \$1.8 million, and actually we generated a positive 18 \$3.8 million, so the positive variance was about 19 \$5.7 million. 20 21 The budget for the coming three weeks through the 22 next hearing on May 31st has been approved by the joint 23 provisional liquidators and the committee, and it calls for an expenditure of a net negative number of three and a half 24 25 million dollars.

We currently have, Your Honor, in cash approximately \$150 million. Now 35 million of that is tied up in placements with banks in Bahrain that have not turned the funds over. I reported to the Court on that at the last hearing. I have sent letters to each of those banks demanding that they turn over the funds. So far we have not received a positive response.

I am -- we are considering other options, turn over complaints, preference complaints, and we have a call with the committee and the JPL set up later in the week to discuss those options, but we are intent on doing everything we possibly can to have those funds repatriated back J.P. Morgan here in New York.

Your Honor, there's one new case that we filed that I would like to tell the Court about.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ROSENTHAL: We filed a case for a nonoperating subsidiary of the debtors called Falcon Gas
Storage. This subsidiary, Your Honor -- this case was filed
in order to protect what we think is a valuable asset of the
Arcapita entities, a \$70 million escrow account that
resulted from a sale of the operating assets of this entity.

The filing was done after consultation with both the joint provisional liquidator, who consented to it, and the advisors for the committee. The -- the filing was

designed to make sure that the asset represented by the \$70 million can be realized by the debtors if at all possible.

Just briefly, Falcon was the majority owner of a -- of a company called NorTex Gas. NorTex basically was an underground gas storage facility that was located in Texas. It was sold in April of 2010 to affiliates of an entity called Alinda Capital Partners for a total consideration of \$515 million.

In response to litigation commenced by minority shareholders at the time of the sale there was a \$70 million escrow put aside and placed in HSBC Bank. That litigation was actually resolved and the parties went to obtain the release of the funds from the escrow only to find that Alinda refused to sign the papers that it had to sign and in fact filed its own lawsuit which is pending before Judge Wood here -- filed its own lawsuit with respect to certain alleged misrepresentations made in connection with the purchase agreement.

Your Honor, we -- we believe that this case should be consolidated -- procedurally consolidated with the other cases and we intend to file a motion essentially to integrate this case with all of the other Arcapita related cases.

THE COURT: All right. Do you anticipate needing

1 any other relief in the near term as to that particular 2 entity? 3 MR. ROSENTHAL: We do not, Your Honor. It's an 4 non-operating entity, so we do not. 5 And you know, I want to make sure, we've said all 6 along that the operating non-debtor affiliates of the 7 Arcapita entities were not in these bankruptcy proceedings, and that's still the case. This is -- this is clearly a 8 9 non-operating, so. 10 So with that, Your Honor, I'll turn it over to 11 Mr. Kelsey to talk about the first matter on the agenda. 12 MR. DUNNE: Actually, Your Honor, if I may be 13 heard and do something similar to Mr. Rosenthal I think it 14 would be helpful so that we don't have to stand up on each 15 of the orders, we can explain kind of the global resolution 16 and how the committee is seeing things in the case to date. 17 THE COURT: All right. 18 MR. DUNNE: As Mr. Rosenthal said, I'm happy to 19 report that we've resolved the disputes. I echo 20 Mr. Rosenthal's comments about the flow of information from 21 and the communications with the debtor, they've been --22 they've been excellent in my view, but I wanted to explain 23 to the Court some of the reasons behind the committees' approach to this case and the kind of paradigm that it's 24

adopted because I think it's going to be relevant to the

settlements you'll see today as well as the issues that we're going to face in the coming weeks with respect to funding obligations and the like, because this is a very different case. It's not a garden variety U.S. restructuring, and we think — the committee believes that it's inappropriate to kind of default to some of the usual settings and course of conduct here.

THE COURT: Well, I don't want to cut you off, but I do want to share this view. I did read the papers very carefully and certainly there was a back and forth about how people see the case, and I'm happy to get people's views about that, but in a vacuum I don't know that -- that it tells me much, so that's why the papers actually -- while I don't have to resolve any of those disputes -- are helpful because they were in a very particular context. We'll worry about this issue, this is how we see it.

So I actually think I did get some useful background in terms of what the parties have been discussing back and forth, but I certainly don't know how much of a preview I need at this point. So -- because it's all going to depend.

But I don't want to cut you off, but I guess what

I'm saying is if you could give me the sort of shorter

version of the speech that would be helpful just because I

don't want to -- usually if we're doing previews then it's

going to no doubt invoke a response and we could be here for a while on something that isn't yet in front of me, so -- and I'll be the only person in this room who won't know precisely what you're debating because I won't have the context.

MR. DUNNE: Right. Right. And part of this was to let you know what we're seeing and to let you know what's coming down the pike without asking for Your Honor to really to weigh in on it, because I do think that that's a -- you know, inappropriate now because you -- we don't have a ripe disagreement at all, and hopefully we never will on these issues, but this does go to the issue of, you know, the committee involvement and oversight, which we've worked out for today, and there are a couple of facts that we're all going to have to struggle with, it's just the realities on the ground as we go forward with respect to this -- these debtors, and I'll give you a couple of examples. I'll give you the condensed version.

One of which arises just from the nature that this is a financial institution, and what does it mean to have ordinary course decisions made by a financial institution when we're sitting on an estate that has 100 plus million dollars of cash in it and no DIP? That sounds like a lot of money, but it's only a few funding obligations away from being spent, and if you look at what the debtors would have

done prepetition in the ordinary course they had already made their investment decisions, they're going to continue to fund. They had -- they had made the decision that that is the best way to maximize value for themselves.

We view that kind of post petition that's not ordinary course, the decision whether to continue to fund or to make those investments are in fact critical. We have scare resources and whether to sell now, hold, what's the cost of holding, what are the dollars that need to be redeployed into non-debtor affiliates in order to hopefully realize some contingent value in the future, something we're all going to struggle with?

I'll just make two other points. One is the fact that there's no DIP facility here, which raises two issues. We don't have another source of funds for the estate, which means the cash that's in the system may be it for us in terms of funding administration expenses as well as funding obligations to the various portfolio companies.

Second, and this relates to the DIP, is I think everyone here knows that if there were a DIP lender there'd be a covenant package, that covenant package would have boxed the debtors behavior in certain respects, set kind of guardrails on it, if you will, which very often the creditors' committee just piggybacks on says we too, give me the notice of this, let me know about this, let me be a

beneficiary of that, which we don't have here to work with so we're kind of working through those issues on the protocol as well.

And lastly, and this will save time on the A&M application, is that we're looking forward to an A&M's involvement. I think they -- and Mr. Rosenthal had trumpeted the Lehman team being on the scene at an earlier hearing -- and what we particularly want is to have A&M bring their independence, their knowledge, their business acumen to bear here because they are the fresh set of eyes.

And as I said before, with a financial institution if you go back to the same people who made the decision to deploy this capital in the first instance there may be a huge thumb on the scale to continue to fund that investment because they still believe in it, when what we need now is somebody to say, okay, prepetition decisions are one thing, we have scare resources now, does it still make sense to fund these or do we just sell them right now?

That in part, Your Honor, explains the committees' mindset and proposed paradigm, but we're flexible on that, and I think both sides have been flexible in terms of what it means in any particular order, and we've worked out resolutions today, and I appreciate the debtor's willingness to accommodate us very late last night on a number of items, and hopefully none of this will really bubble up to a ripe

Page 18 1 dispute, but that's what we're struggling with right now. 2 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 3 MR. DUNNE: Thank you. MR. ROSENTHAL: Your Honor, I'm going to be 4 5 mindful of what you say. 6 We did have an issue about how much control the 7 committee has in this case. We've resolved it for purposes 8 of these motions, and if it comes up in the future I'm sure 9 we'll be making our --10 THE COURT: No, I did see the tension and I 11 understand where everybody is coming from, and certainly I 12 think the things that motivated some of the early orders and 13 the early actions taken once the case was filed had to do 14 with the unique facts here, but I think that the debtors did 15 a very good job of getting in front of some of those issues, 16 and in terms of establishing bank accounts, segregating 17 funds, and addressing concerns about transparency given the -- that the cash and operations are overseas, so. 18 19 MR. ROSENTHAL: Yes, that's very important to us. 20 Mr. Kelsey will take the first motion. 21 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 22 MR. KELSEY: Good morning, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Good morning.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher on behalf of the debtors.

MR. KELSEY: For the record, Matthew Kelsey,

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As you know there are a lot of items on the agenda, but as Mr. Rosenthal indicated, pleased to announce that certainly with respect to the debtors and the committee resolved all issues outstanding between them. So Your Honor, if you don't object I'd like to skip to agenda items 10 through 13 to describe the resolution that the committee and the debtors have reached on these what I'd consider --THE COURT: All right, so we'll loop back to --MR. KELSEY: And then we would move back to the beginning --THE COURT: Right. MR. KELSEY: -- of the agenda after that. THE COURT: All right. If it works for you it works for me. MR. KELSEY: Right. Thank you, Your Honor. So the first item of the agenda, item 10, that we're going skipping ahead to item 10 is the debtor's motion seeking authority to employ ordinary course professionals. And there was a back and forth as you know between the committee and the debtors on what's appropriate and what's not, and I think we've reached agreement, and the agreement roughly is as follows. It's not -- I say roughly only because it hasn't been rendered into a form of order yet. THE COURT: Fair enough.

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That if the debtors supplement their MR. KELSEY: list of ordinary course professionals the debtors would provide the committee with a ten-day notice period with an opportunity to object and to seek expedited relief, and we -- and the debtors would consent in this order to the expedited relief requested by the committee. Secondly, we would agree to reduce the ordinary course professional cap from what was proposed to 100,000 per month with a 500,000 aggregate cap. The committee had proposed 50,000 and 500,000, and while I'm okay with the aggregate cap, what I'd like to avoid is a potential foot fault of an ordinary course professional maybe going -- maybe having one particular busy month and having to file a fee application. So long as the aggregate cap is 500- we think a little more flexibility on the monthly cap makes sense. THE COURT: All right. MR. KELSEY: And finally after discussions with the United States Trustee's Office we've agreed to withdraw Ernst & Young from our ordinary course professional list. THE COURT: All right. That answers one of my questions as whether the U.S. Trustee had any particular interest in this application, and it sounds like that's -that's been answered. Mr. Morrissey?

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MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honor, what Mr. Kelsey just said about Ernst & Young I did know about that and I'm -- I was happy to hear it, because Ernst & Young cannot come in under 327(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which was reserved for special counsel, underscoring the word counsel, so that's -- that works out fine.

What I didn't know until Mr. Kelsey just said it was that there is an agreement to increase the cap to \$100,000 a month and \$500,000 for the whole case. I knew about the \$500,000 for the whole case, which is fine with us, we -- we think -- and again, I'm just spouting it off the top of my head right now, Your Honor -- that \$100,000 is -- is a lot for an ordinary course professional.

The maximum in large cases that we have had has been 50,000 a month, and the debtors and I guess the committee has agreed, propose to double that amount, and I understand what Mr. Kelsey was saying about one particular month possibly sending somebody over the top, but you know, if Mr. Kelsey was going to leave a little cushion, say 55,000, something like that, I might be able to live with that, but to double the amount is in the U.S. Trustee's view quite excessive, and I'm not aware of special circumstances of this case warranting going up that high.

THE COURT: All right. I don't know if that view is something you've heard before, just now, or what the

1 status of conversations were because obviously I don't have 2 any papers from the U.S. Trustee's Office on this particular 3 issue. 4 MR. KELSEY: Well, I knew that the U.S. Trustee 5 was advocating what the committee was advocating in the 6 committees' papers --7 THE COURT: All right. So essentially they didn't 8 file because they saw what the committee had filed, which 9 sometimes happens, and then somebody goes away, and -- all 10 right. I see somebody rising from the committee. 11 MR. FLECK: Good morning, Your Honor, Evan Fleck 12 of Milbank, Tweed for the committee. 13 If I may, I just wanted to add, I agree with 14 Mr. Kelsey's representations with respect to the agreement. 15 There's one other point that may actually 16 facilitate this issue that's been raised by the U.S. 17 Trustee. 18 The debtors have also agreed to provide monthly 19 reporting to the committee with respect to expenses, and 20 that helped us to get comfortable that we're going to be 21 monitoring those expenses. 22 THE COURT: All right. 23 The fees are very important for all of MR. FLECK: 24 us, the committee in particular of a case of this type --25 THE COURT: Right.

Page 23 MR. FLECK: -- and we'll be --1 2 THE COURT: So essentially you're more comfortable 3 because it's monthly as opposed to being quarterly, which 4 would be more of a problem with that cap. 5 MR. FLECK: That's right. So --6 THE COURT: All right. 7 MR. FLECK: -- we'll be on top of that. THE COURT: Mr. Morrissey, does that -- does that 8 assist you in achieving a level of comfort? 9 10 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honor --11 THE COURT: Yes, but. MR. MORRISSEY: Well, actually, no, but. The --12 13 THE COURT: All right. Well, I gave it a shot. 14 (Laughter) 15 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honor, yeah, I mean I don't 16 have authority to go over \$50,000 in any case, and the case 17 that happens --18 THE COURT: No, that's fair enough. MR. MORRISSEY: -- to be made that this is -- this 19 20 case is different from all other large Chapter 11's here. 21 So with -- I'm not going to belabor the point, 22 Your Honor, but I just can't go up that high. 23 THE COURT: No, I understand, and there is a 24 benefit to a bright line because otherwise I spent time 25 arguing about this in every single case and I do try to be

mindful. I think Judge Gerber even has a line in one of his opinions -- several of his opinions -- that basically says that where courts in this -- in this -- judges in this courthouse have done something that he defaults that absent a real good reason not to just because there is a benefit to consistency.

So -- and now having understood while the U.S.

Trustee didn't file papers because they had the same view it has the committee I am inclined to go with the standard in the courthouse, just really as they say when people break up with each others it's not you, it's me --

(Laugher)

THE COURT: -- it's -- it really is something I think consistency is important, and again, I don't think it's fair to parties to have to refight that battle every time they come in and I don't think it's helpful for people to feel like they're just -- judges are picking numbers out of the air.

So that's actually one of the things I checked before I came out here was what has been done in some other large cases that I have. So -- so I'm inclined to go with that.

If in light of that you might want to tweak the reporting requirement bimonthly, something so that we don't run up a lot of administrative expenses -- I understand part

of this is about administrative expenses -- but if we go with a standard number there may be a way to kind of keep that cost done.

MR. FLECK: Your Honor, and the only point obviously you're the decider here, and if that's -- if that's the Court's ruling, the monthly reporting was an important issue for the committee, they're going to be looking for that from all the professionals in the case, and the reason in addition to what Mr. Morrissey was saying, if people are tripping over the line for monthly expenses and then have to go to the expense of filing retention applications and that process that obviously is costly and we wanted to just be aware of that in advance. If we see someone getting close we expect there could be a dialogue with the debtors about that professional.

THE COURT: No, I understand that.

Mr. Morrissey, does your office have a view one way or the other? Again, I'm concerned about consistency in terms of what the -- these caps are tied to in terms of monthly reporting or quarterly reporting.

MR. MORRISSEY: No, Your Honor, in fact that was

-- my understanding and Mr. Kelsey and Mr. Fleck can correct

me if I'm wrong on this -- is that this is an ad hoc or sui

generis deal that they made in the context of this

particular motion, but we don't have a position on whether

Page 26 1 there's a special monthly or quarterly reporting requirement 2 in --3 THE COURT: All right. MR. MORRISSEY: -- association with this. 4 5 THE COURT: All right. Because one of the things 6 I do think, there was a back and forth about where the 7 appropriate level of -- of communication here is, and I'm 8 all in favor of communication, but I did take the debtors' point that -- that about administrative expenses and about 9 10 it being micromanaged, so I do want to find an appropriate 11 way to do that. 12 So I'd ask at a break the committee think about 13 what -- what reporting requirements, whether there isn't a 14 tweak that's appropriate in light of the cap being halved 15 for months, which is a big deal, and I know it's a burden on 16 the debtors, and again, you're sort of being sacrificed on 17 the alter of consistency, but I don't want to sort of add reporting requirements on top of reporting requirements, I 18 19 don't think that's fair. 20 MR. FLECK: Your Honor, we take the Court's point 21 and we'll -- the committee --22 THE COURT: All right --23 MR. FLECK: -- will find bimonthly --

thank you. I'm sure you can figure something out.

THE COURT: Yeah, I'm sure you can -- all right,

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I have some confidence that we'll 1 2 figure something out as well --3 THE COURT: All right, thank you. MR. KELSEY: -- Your Honor. Okay. 4 5 understand your ruling. 6 And moving forward I think item 11 on the agenda 7 is the employee wage motion. And the resolution we reached with the committee 8 9 is that we were going to limit the committees' consent 10 rights only to those post petition payments to employees 11 that result from, you know, their leaving -- leaving the 12 employment of the debtors or otherwise terminated, which is 13 actually consistent with -- there's a -- not really a 14 program, it's a statute in Bahrain that talks about an 15 indemnity, but it's not an indemnity in the traditional 16 sense that, you know --17 THE COURT: It's really severance. 18 MR. KELSEY: -- American attorneys -- it's really a statutory severance payment, and we said, well, yeah, you 19 20 know, if someone left we'd either seek the committees' 21 consent or approval of the Bankruptcy Court to make those 22 payments when an employee left, but otherwise post petition 23 payments to employees in the ordinary course would be 24 approved. 25 We have agreed to limited reporting, which is

after the fact in the budgeting process, we've disclosed to the committee and their professionals payments we've made post petition to employees, but to be clear because we're going to report it in the budget it's not an opportunity for the committee to take another bite at the apple of the debtor's judgment to pay their employees or in a certain amount, it's just simply a reporting function.

THE COURT: All right. That's fine.

MR. KELSEY: Great. Thank you, Your Honor.

Moving ahead here to item 12 is the critical and foreign vendors.

And the resolution we've reached with the committee on that is that we would give the committee consent or we would seek further order of the Court to make any payments to a critical or foreign vendor in excess of the \$2 million cap.

And then with respect to payments to yet unidentified critical or foreign vendors that would be within the cap, we would give the committee this ten-day notice period prior to payment --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. KELSEY: -- with an ability to object and be heard on an expedited basis and the debtors wouldn't object to a hearing on those grounds.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, I missed the beginning part

Page 29 of that. You're saying these are ones that are up to the 1 2 cap but haven't been identified --3 MR. KELSEY: Correct. THE COURT: -- by the estate? 4 5 MR. KELSEY: Correct, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Okay. Because I remember there was a 7 particular number. I don't -- I think it was 1.55, but then 8 there was some additional cushion built in, so you're really 9 talking about the cushion. 10 MR. KELSEY: Correct, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: All right. That seems a very 12 appropriate resolution. 13 MR. KELSEY: Thank you, Your Honor. Although I 14 give Mr. Fleck some credit on that as well. 15 THE COURT: All right. 16 MR. FLECK: Thank you. 17 MR. KELSEY: All right, so item 13 is the 18 insurance program motion. 19 THE COURT: All right. 20 MR. KELSEY: And the resolution we've reached with 21 the committee is with respect to the payment of prepetition 22 deductibles in excess of \$100,000 --23 THE COURT: All right. 24 MR. KELSEY: -- we would give the committee a 25 consultation right, which again, we mean a ten-day notice

before we intend to pay with an opportunity to object and seek expedited relief with the debtors consenting to the expedited nature of the relief. You know, in this order so that the committee doesn't have to reach out to the debtors ands say, hey, we want an expedited hearing and we can't hold them up. That's --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. KELSEY: -- a feature of this, okay.

With respect to renewal of policies that lapse we're obtaining new policies. We would give again the committee that same consultation right, the ten-day notice, with an opportunity to object and be heard on an expedited basis provided that with respect to any new policy, Your Honor, if the debtors seek new coverage and determine that in obtaining such coverage they'd be doing something that's outside the ordinary course of the business we'd either seek the committees' consent or an order of the Bankruptcy Court.

THE COURT: All right. And when you say outside the ordinary course of business I assume that part of that has to do with if the new coverage is replacing preexisting coverage that has lapsed. In other words, you're going to a different carrier and getting similar kind of coverage.

MR. KELSEY: Right. I would think that would be ordinary course.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. KELSEY: What is or isn't ordinary course I don't know in terms of -- if we felt that it was ordinary course -- if it wasn't ordinary course we'd seek the committees' consent --THE COURT: All right. MR. KELSEY: -- or an order of the Court. thought it was ordinary course and the committee didn't they would have the right to object quickly and seek expedited relief. THE COURT: All right. MR. KELSEY: Okay. I think that hits the main issues of dispute other than some retentions, which will be discussed later. THE COURT: All right. MR. KELSEY: So with that I thought maybe we could go back item 2 of the agenda. THE COURT: All right. Well, let me actually just -- since we've just discussed those motions I just want to go through them and check those off the list of things to do. So the first one was number 10 -- and again, for all these I've heard -- the tweaks to the requested relief and the agreements that have been reached, so I'm only asking for if there's any additional comments anybody else who wants to be heard on something that hasn't been

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1 discussed. So for number 10, ordinary course professionals 2 I don't see anybody else who wants to be heard. I will grant that consistent with the discussion that we've had. 3 4 And for number 11, which is wages, I don't see 5 anyone else commenting. Again, I will grant that consistent 6 with the representations and agreements that have been put 7 before me. 8 Critical and foreign vendors, same ruling. 9 And insurance coverage I don't see anyone else who 10 has a comment, and that same ruling applies. 11 MR. KELSEY: Great. Thank you, Your Honor. So moving head to item 2 of the agenda. Really 12 13 item 2 and 3 are pretty closely related, and that's debtor's 14 motions to extent the deadline to file reports pursuant to 15 bankruptcy rule 2015.3 and the file schedules and 16 statements. We're asking for a 45-day extension up to and 17 through June 21st, 2012. 18 We have on the line Steve Kotarba from A&M and he 19 submitted a declaration in support of both of these motions. 20 Your Honor, I'd like to move to enter that into 21 the record. 22 THE COURT: All right, any objection? 23 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honor, once again for the 24 benefit of those on the phone, Richard Morrissey from the U.S. Trustee's Office. 25

Page 33 1 We had discussion to this and basically agreed to 2 this -- it's not a complicated legal issue here, Your Honor. 3 We believe that a deadline of May 21st would be 4 more appropriate, in fact I think it's somewhat generous. 5 Giving them 90 days from the petition date is an awful lot to file schedules. 7 Practically speaking for my office, Your Honor, we 8 have to schedule a 341 meeting and creditors' meeting and we 9 really can't go forward with that until the schedules and 10 the statement of financial affairs are filed. 11 In addition as Mr. Kelsey has noted, it's also to 12 file a 2015.3 statement. And I understand this is a big and 13 complicated case, but once again echoing what I said earlier 14 on another motion, the question is why is this case 15 different from all the others here? 16 This is a very, very long period of time, 90 days 17 to get information to the parties in interest and the Court as far as exactly what the debtor's assets are, what the 18 19 liabilities are, and quite simply, Your Honor, we think that 20 going all the way to June 21st is excessive here. So we 21 would ask for May 21st to be the deadline. 22 THE COURT: All right. But to answer the smaller 23 question, I don't think you have an objection to the declaration being introduced into evidence, so I'm going to 24

accept that.

MR. MORRISSEY: Not at all. 1 2 (Debtors' Exhibit No. 1 was admitted) 3 THE COURT: I understand these things are often 4 done sort of in a dollop at a time -- a certain amount of 5 time and I understand the benefit to that, and in I think most cases I'm a fan of that approach. I do think that 7 there's, as I understand it one secured creditor here and 8 everyone else is an unsecured creditor, and for that reason 9 and several others there obviously is a very energized, 10 unsecured creditor community that is very adequately 11 represented here, so I'm a little less concerned about the 12 extension given that fact. 13 But let me ask if there's any ability to move the 14 date up a little bit, just because deadlines are what make 15 the world go. So if it --16 MR. KELSEY: I would say --17 THE COURT: -- set for June 21st the odds of it 18 happening before then are pretty much zero. 19 MR. KELSEY: No, actually one of the reasons we 20 asked for 45 days was we want -- we didn't want to have to 21 come back and ask again. We think that 45 days will give us 22 ample time to get it done. 23 THE COURT: All right. 24 MR. KELSEY: We could shorten the period if it 25 would please Mr. Morrissey. I think two weeks is a little

Page 35 1 tight, but I think, you know, June 10th. We can cut --2 THE COURT: All right. 3 MR. KELSEY: -- cut a lot, you know, almost two weeks off --4 5 THE COURT: We'll split the baby and we'll make it 6 -- we'll make it June 10th. 7 And again, I'm comfortable -- again, I understand 8 the desire to get this information out as it is important, 9 and again, I think there's a benefit to consistency and 10 setting everything at the last possible end date is -- is a 11 bit difficult, because essentially it becomes a default for 12 every case that comes in here. 13 So but at the same time I am -- I'm doing this in 14 light of the fact that the record before me demonstrates a 15 very vigorous and extended and in-depth dialogue between the 16 committee and the debtors here, which I think allows me to 17 rest easy as to the information that is being provided. 18 MR. KELSEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 19 Just June 10th I think is a Sunday. That's what 20 I'm being told. 21 THE COURT: Oh, all right. Well, then let's make 22 it -- since nobody every wants to think about things over 23 the weekend make it -- make it June 8th. 24 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: Thank you.

Page 36 MR. KELSEY: Okay, Your Honor, so that's 2 and 3 1 2 and so the deadline will be June 8th for both. 3 And if you had any questions for Mr. Kotarba --THE COURT: No. 4 5 MR. KELSEY: -- he's available. 6 THE COURT: Thank you. 7 MR. KELSEY: Okay. So number 4 on the agenda is 8 the interim compensation procedures. We've looked at 9 standing order M-412 and the proposed form of order is in 10 substantial compliance with the standing order of the Court. 11 As the committees' onmi response indicated, the debtors have agreed to clarify the order to note that a 12 13 failure to timely file quarterly fee application will result 14 in a professional not being paid subsequent amounts on 15 monthly fee statements until the quarterly fee application 16 was filed and approved, but otherwise there'd be no other 17 jeopardy that would attach. 18 THE COURT: All right. Anyone want to be heard on 19 this application? 20 All right, I will grant the request. 21 MR. KELSEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 22 All right, moving onto agenda item number 5, 23 that's the debtor's motion to file the list of its customer 24 names under seal. We've received no objection. 25 You know, as a private equity firm and investment

bank Arcapita greatest resources obviously are its

connections with its investors, and a public disclosure of

the identity of those investors could severely damage the

business in the form of allowing competitors to poach these

investors, and so we thought it was appropriate to file this

confidential, sensitive, commercial information under seal.

THE COURT: All right Appone want to be heard as

THE COURT: All right. Anyone want to be heard as to this request?

MR. FLECK: Your Honor, Evan Fleck again from Milbank on behalf of the committee.

We -- the committee has no objection to the relief requested.

I'd note that the committees' advisors have received the list for purposes of running conflicts and that'll be reflected in the retention applications, and obviously nothing in the motion prejudices the rights of parties, including the committee, should there be a need to conduct discovery or any other matters with respect to the names on the list.

THE COURT: All right. No, that all makes good sense, it's sealing it for a particular purpose and that certainly does prevent a party from coming back if we need to handle things in a different way in the future, but I will grant the motion.

MR. KELSEY: Great. Thank you, Your Honor.

Page 38 1 I think with that we move on the professional 2 retentions, and I'm going to cede the podium to my 3 colleague, Janet Weiss. 4 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 5 (Pause) 6 MS. WEISS: And good morning, Your Honor, Janet 7 Weiss --8 THE COURT: Good morning. MS. WEISS: -- for the debtors. 9 10 I'm going to move to agenda item number 6, which 11 is the retention of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. 12 We're seeking retention under Section 327(a) of 13 the Bankruptcy Code. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher will perform the services that are typically rendered to debtors-in-14 15 possession as general bankruptcy counsel. 16 We have filed a declaration of Mr. Rosenthal who 17 is in the court. He has in the declaration stated that we are disinterested under Section 10114 and that Gibson, Dunn 18 19 does not hold or represent an interest that is materially 20 adverse to the debtors. We have discussed the issue of the retention with 21 22 the U.S. Trustee's Office and we have agreed on a few 23 things. 24 In the retention engagement letter there are two 25 provisions that were standard in Gibson, Dunn's engagement

letter. One provided for an indemnity, and we are putting in the order clarifying that we are not seeking indemnity.

And the second is a provision for secretarial overtime, and the order now will also clarify that we're not seeking those payments.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. WEISS: In addition, in the declaration of Mr. Rosenthal we disclosed a connection with an entity called Church Street Health Management, and the U.S. Trustee requested that we disclose this a little bit more prevalently by discussing it in the court.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher represent an entity called Garrison Investment Group which is -- represents the -- which is the DIP agent and a prepetition lender to Church Street. Church Street is an indirect affiliate of the debtors and the debtors own a majority of those interests.

Church Street itself is in a bankruptcy proceeding in the Middle District of Tennessee and is represented by King & Spaulding.

In that bankruptcy case the debtor has already acknowledged that there is no equity value in the company. There has been an auction, a 363 auction, and it's proposed that Garrison, along with another group of investors, will take the assets free and clear, there'll be no payment or distribution to equity, and in fact there's a valuation

that's being filed that shows that they're hundreds of 1 2 million dollars out of the money. And so we don't see that there's a conflict. 3 4 They -- that entity is not a debtor, there's 5 separate counsel representing them, but we wanted to make sure that that was clearly disclosed, and it is in the 7 Rosenthal declaration. The second of the Rosenthal declaration discloses 8 9 that Credit Suisse is a client of just a little bit more 10 than one percent of the revenues over the past year, and 11 we've agreed with the U.S. Trustee that we will seek conflict counsel, to the extent that there are any direct 12 13 litigation or direct conflict in the case with Credit 14 Suisse. 15 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 16 Anyone want to be heard in connection with this 17 motion? 18 MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honor, once again Richard 19 Morrissey for the U.S. Trustee. 20 As far as this motion, Your Honor, this U.S. 21 Trustee that has no objection. 22 One of the things that I was discussing with 23 Ms. Weiss and colleagues was the issue that concerns us in any large case, which is overlap between what Gibson, Dunn 24

in this case is going to be doing and special counsel that

you'll be hearing about momentarily is going to be doing, so we -- we drew some lines in the sand, so to speak, in terms of line that is aren't going to be crossed, and the U.S. Trustee is satisfied at this stage that there aren't -there should not be any overlap. And as far as the conflict issues Ms. Weiss went over them very clearly and completely and the U.S. Trustee has no objection to this firm's retention. THE COURT: All right. I will grant the application to retain Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. MS. WEISS: Okay, thank you. And one issue I also wanted to put on the record that I didn't, but that we had agreed to with Mr. Morrissey, which is there's going to be an ethical screen in place so that no member of Gibson, Dunn or no party in Gibson, Dunn who represents any party in the Church Street matter will be representing the debtors in this case. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. MS. WEISS: The next agenda item is number 7, which is the retention of Trowers & Hamlins. Trowers & Hamlins is a firm in Bahrain, the debtors are seeking to retain them pursuant to Section 327(e) of the Bankruptcy Code as special counsel. Trowers & Hamlins has advised the debtors in the past and on all matters with respect to Bahraini law.

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Under Bahraini law it is required for special opinions and appearance before the Court that a separate firm represent the -- any party in Bahrain and that any matter under Bahraini law is -- if there was an opinion or a formal affirmative statement under Bahraini law that that be given by a special local firm.

In this case the Bahraini firm is going to be Hatem S. (ph) -- and excuse me if I mispronounce this -- Zubee Y Partners (ph), they're going to be retained as ordinary course counsel pursuant with the terms of that order.

Also for Trowers & Hamlins they filed a declaration, they meet the standard of 327(e), they don't have any interest that's adverse to the debtors with respect to the matters for which they're being retained.

And with that we would seek their retention.

THE COURT: All right. Anyone want to be heard in connection with the application to retain Trowers & Hamlins, LLP?

MR. MORRISSEY: Your Honor, with respect to the special counsel retention, obviously the only one concern there could be overlap between what the Trowers firm is doing and what the Hatem firm is doing, but having said that we did work this out with debtor's counsel and will we have no objection to that retention.

THE COURT: All right. Given that representation 1 2 I will grant the application. MS. WEISS: Your Honor, the next item that's up is 3 4 on the -- sorry -- it's agenda number 8, which is Alvarez & 5 Marsal. 6 The committee filed in their objection cited 7 Alvarez & Marsal that there was an objection to this 8 retention, and the committee has stated their views 9 regarding an incentive fee that's going to be brought before 10 this Court in the future; however, at this time we're not 11 seeking approvement of any incentive fee, we're seeking only retention on an hourly basis for purposes of the interim 12 13 hearing, and as such there's been an agreement with the 14 committee. 15 Also in response to the U.S. Trustee's request I 16 want to highlight, which has also been already disclosed to 17 the Court, that Alvarez & Marsal, a separate team, is representing Church Street in their bankruptcy case, and by 18 19 coincidence in that same matter, but there's an ethical 20 screen in place, and as we've mentioned, the debtors are out 21 of the money and so we perceive that there's no conflict on 22 that. 23 THE COURT: All right. Anyone want to be heard in 24 connection with the Alvarez & Marsal application? 25 Again, I did -- I did read the committees'

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THE COURT: All right. I will grant the

application for -- and I quess you're going to title this an

1 Marsal on the -- based on the description provided to me and 2 we'll deal with any other issues as necessary. 3 MS. WEISS: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. The next agenda item is number 9, and this is with 4 5 respect to Linklaters. 6 The debtors are seeking to retain Linklaters as 7 special counsel pursuant to 327(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. 8 Mr. Richard Good is on the phone, he submitted a 9 declaration in support of the application. 10 In response to the U.S. Trustee's request we're 11 making two modifications to the scope of services that are reflected in the proposed order, which is Linklaters will 12 13 not be providing any services and rendering advise with 14 respect to either U.S. law or Bahraini law. U.S. law being 15 the providence of Gibson, Dunn and Bahraini being the 16 providence of Trowers and the special Bahraini firm. 17 Those two changes appear in Sections (c) and (h) in the scope of services, and as I mentioned, that's not 18 19 changed in the proposed order. 20 The retention application of Linklaters had also 21 requested that Linklaters directly hire the queens counsel 22 who is Mr. Anthony Zachareli (ph), after discussions with 23 the committee and the U.S. Trustee we are not seeking that 24 treatment right now.

Mr. Zachareli performed services that were

primarily prepetition, he has a retainer, and it's not anticipated at this time that he's going to be performing future services, and so at this time we are not seeking that determination. If he performs future services we'll have to address it at that time.

And then with respect to the prepetition fees he's got a retainer that covers those amounts and that will be treated as a claim in the ordinary course.

THE COURT: All right. With that said anyone want to be heard in connection with this application?

MR. FLECK: Your Honor, for the record, Evan Fleck.

One additional clarification that reflects the agreement between the committee and the debtors.

We understand there's a prepetition relationship and Linklaters was -- had done work for Arcapita prepetition as well, and the -- we have reached an agreement that with respect to fees that are incurred by Linklaters that those fees will be subject to a debtor allocation agreement so the fees will be borne appropriately based upon the work and where the benefit is enjoyed among the Arcapita family, and that is the subject of further work between the committee and the debtors to arrive at that exact agreement and what that should look like.

THE COURT: All right. All right --

1 MR. FLECK: With that -- with that modification 2 and understanding we have no objection. 3 THE COURT: All right. MS. WEISS: Your Honor, I should point out that 4 5 it's currently not anticipated that Linklaters will perform services on behalf of the deal companies, but to the extent 7 they do perform such services there will be an allocation 8 method. 9 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, I think that's 10 paragraph 45 of the objection and it sounds like it's dealt 11 with appropriately. 12 All right, in light of those comments and the 13 agreement of the parties I will grant the application to 14 retain and employee Linklaters as has been described. 15 MS. WEISS: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. 16 The last issue that is up is agenda number 14, and 17 the is an additional cash management order. This is the fourth interim cash management order, and Your Honor, we 18 19 don't expect that the entire case will go forward on interim 20 cash management orders. 21 We are working to put into place a longer term 22 protocol that will govern how the debtors spend money in 23 connection particularly with preserving the value and maximizing the value with the deal assets. That's in the 24 25 work, that will be negotiated with the committee.

There's also been significant progress in negotiating that with the provisional liquidator in the Cayman Islands and we hope to have that be presented to Your Honor shortly.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I think a fourth interim is certainly appropriate under the circumstances and a lot of progress has been made and I appreciate that so, besides you don't have the record in this courtroom for the number of interim financing orders.

(Laughter)

THE COURT: I'd like to say you're not even close, so given the work that has been done to date and the agreement of the parties I'm happy to sign off on a fourth interim order.

MS. WEISS: Okay. And Your Honor, just for purposes of disclosure. The fourth interim order includes the same protections that we had in the third interim order that included granting administrative expense claims to debtors that loaned money on an intracompany basis and also included some reporting requirements specifically to Standard Charter, and those will remain in the fourth interim order.

THE COURT: All right. And am I safe to say that that resolves the limited objection of Standard Charter that was filed?

Page 49 MS. WEISS: Mr. Greer is in the courtroom, he can 1 2 address that. 3 MR. GREER: Good morning, Your Honor, Brian --THE COURT: Good morning. 4 5 MR. GREER: -- Greer of Dechert LLP for Standard 6 Charter. 7 As you know from our pleadings, Your Honor, we 8 have serious issues with the cash management and the funding between the debtor and the non-debtor entities. 9 10 For today's hearing we are okay with the form of 11 fourth interim order, but our rights are reserved and hopefully we won't be litigating the issues before Your 12 13 Honor, but that could come sooner rather than later. 14 THE COURT: All right, thank you. 15 MS. WEISS: Mr. Rosenthal also reminds me that the 16 provisional liquidator has also specifically requested that 17 they state that their rights are preserved on the record and particularly with respect to the administrative claims, but 18 19 that will be addressed as I said in the protocol. 20 THE COURT: All right. And how do you intend on 21 teeing the protocol up? As part of a final order or just as 22 a separate motion or just as an agreement among the parties? 23 MS. WEISS: Your Honor, there are issues in the protocol that resolve the cash management issues 24 25 specifically with respect to the structure of the secured

Page 50 1 claim by Standard Charter, and I don't know if there'll be a 2 separate motion to approve the protocol, but I do as a part 3 of that that will incorporate into the final cash management order. 4 5 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 6 MS. WEISS: Okay, thank you, Your Honor. 7 And I believe that's it on the agenda. 8 THE COURT: Well, I think we have one more 9 motion --10 MS. WEISS: Oh, I'm sorry. 11 THE COURT: -- of Commerzbank. MS. WEISS: I'm sorry, how could I forget. 12 13 My colleague, Mr. Kelsey will address that. 14 MR. KELSEY: Actually it's not my motion so I 15 thought maybe Clifford Chance should start. 16 THE COURT: Oh, okay. All right. And let me cut 17 to the chase here. 18 As I understand it nobody wants to improve their 19 rights, you're -- this strikes me as a drafting issue where 20 it's simply a matter of everyone preserving their rights. 21 Meaning if you can't do something by virtue of the 22 bankruptcy you can do this one of two ways, which is lift 23 the stay with the understanding that you're not improving

your position, or not lift the stay and put in some language

to say the failure to file a notice does not -- won't in any

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way, shape, or form be held against you.

MR. ANTONOFF: I'll address that, Your Honor. For the record, Rick Antonoff from Clifford Chance in New York.

My colleague, Janeen (indiscernible - 01:20:28) Clifford

Chance is with me.

We're here on behalf of Commerzbank, which is one of the largest unsecured creditors in the case. And just to again cut to the chase to take your cue, I think that if this were just a matter of U.S. law then your second approach might work, just to say that all rights are preserved and when we -- when Commerzbank does file a proof of claim it won't be detrimental to their claim that they hadn't sent a demand notice, but unfortunately this is not just a matter of U.S. law and I'm not sure that that would solve the problem. And if I can present the -- frame it for Your Honor the way that I -- the way that I see it.

Commerzbank holds a claim under a guarantee in an amount of 125 million Euro, which is roughly \$163 million.

The guarantee is for a credit facility that was made available to -- by Commerzbank to a company called PBC Lux (ph) which is a holding company for a group of operating companies called a Profine Group, that just so you know manufactures plastic window and door products.

The guarantee by its terms becomes due and payable on demand; however, that demand cannot be made until at

least 14 days after the primary obligation of PBC Lux becomes due and payable. That primary obligation became due and payable on March 12th of this year, 14 days later was March 26th, and Commerzbank could have delivered a demand notice on the 26th but for the intervening commencement of Arcapita's bankruptcy case on March 19th and the automatic stay arising, which at least arguably and as a matter of prudence, presumably acts as a stay against the delivery of a demand notice.

Now as I said, if this were simply a matter of U.S. law that would be the end of the story, Commerzbank could file a proof of claim and we wouldn't be here asking for relief, but the guarantee in this case is governed by the laws of Bahrain, and it's not clear to us and apparently not clear to the debtors either whether under the substantive law of Bahrain failure to deliver a demand notice is a defense to liability under the guarantee. But if it is, and even if there's any chance that it is, then Commerzbank should be granted the relief requested in the motion to permit it to deliver the demand notice to avoid even the possibility that its guaranteed claim is lost due to the imposition of the automatic stay coming into existence in between the time that the primary obligation became due and the first day Commerzbank could have made demand 14 days later.

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The automatic stay is not intended to deprive creditors of their claim, and this was addressed squarely by Judge Schwartzberg in a Texaco case where he made clear, although he denied the relief in this case he did so because sending a notice of acceleration in that case would have the effect of locking in a higher interest rates on notes that were issued by the debtor, and in that case would preclude the debtor from arguing that the lower rate applied.

Up to a point the Texaco case is similar to our situation. The issue arose in Texaco because post petition the debtor unilaterally set a lower interest rate to begin on a certain future date, the noteholder sought stay relief to accelerate their notes before that date in order to preserve the higher interest rate. Judge Schwartzberg denied the relief because the notes were not in default other than by virtue of the issuers bankruptcy filing and accelerating the notes on that basis would lock in the higher interest rate. But Judge Schwartzberg said that if that were not the case, if the noteholders only sought to preserve the status quo stay relief would be appropriate, and he said, I quote:

"The debtors should not be permitted to use the automatic stay and argue that a formal notice of acceleration is a condition precedent to the noteholder's right to claim the higher interest rate."

Now whether to grant stay relief is within the discretion of the Court and in exercising that discretion the Court is guided by the Second Circuit precedent, principally the Sonnax decision from 1990, which lists 12 factors, all but one of which are not applicable in this case. The factors deal mostly with whether to permit litigation or other judicial proceedings to continue in another forum, but the one factor that is applicable is the balance of harms, and that factor weighs in favor of granting relief to Commerzbank for the simple reason that not being permitted to deliver the notice in May, no matter how uncertain the parties are about it, it may as a matter of Bahraini law jeopardize Commerzbank's claim. That's the harm to Commerzbank if relief is not granted.

That possibility is measured against the fact that delivering the notice causes absolutely no harm to the debtors or these estates, and that's because no matter how the notice is cast, whether it's a claim, a demand,

Commerzbank does not seek and this Court will certainly not allow Commerzbank at that stage to have its claim allowed or to collect anything at this stage of the case and does not foreclose any defense Arcapita may have to challenge the claim other than a defense that arises solely due to the automatic stay.

So I'll finish where I started. The automatic

stay is not intended to deprive creditors of their claims, but that is precisely what Arcapita wants the stay to do. In paragraph 6 of their objection I quote, "Absent the demand, Commerzbank has no right to collect on or assert a claim in respect to the guarantee." Your Honor, that's an outrageous statement and this is precisely the evil that Judge Schwartzberg recognized in Texaco, that a debtor would use the automatic stay to argue with impunity that a condition to a claim has not occurred, and because the automatic stay prevents that condition from occurring the creditor has no claim. an abuse of the automatic stay and should not be endorsed by the Court. And unless the Court has any questions I'll reserve further argument after others have spoken. THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from other parties first, I may have a question of two after they're done. MR. KELSEY: Thank you, Your Honor. Again for the

MR. KELSEY: Thank you, Your Honor. Again for the record Matt Kelsey appearing on behalf of the debtors.

I think the blank of harms Sonnax factors are the appropriate factor for the Court to consider here. And I guess what the debtor has been struggling with here is if there's a clear right to the claim, right, not lifting the stay there's no harm to Commerzbank if the stay isn't

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lifted.

THE COURT: What it sounds like what there is is uncertainty, and as people have been talking I'm been flipping through the papers to see if there's been any declaration or evidence given to me about what people's views are of the applicable foreign law, and I don't have any unless I'm missing something, and the pleadings are fairly short. Normally I'm a big fan of short pleadings, but it seems that there is a complicated issue under foreign law as to the nature of this notice, and I don't think I have any evidence one way or the other to inform me about that.

I'm not -- I'm not saying that people should go out and get experts and spend a lot of money on this, but what I'm saying is the parties sound like they both are unclear -- and correct me if I'm wrong -- about what the nature of this notice is, whether it's improving somebody's rights or it's simply reserving the status quo, and I'm wondering how I'm supposed to figure that out in the absence of any evidence, particularly in the parties find it complex enough that they're having trouble reaching a -- reaching a definitive answer.

MR. KELSEY: Right. You predicted where I was going, Your Honor. I said, you know, there's either a clear right to this or there's not.

The burden is on Commerzbank I think to persuade you that the cause exists to lift the automatic stay, which is prevents a demand notice and acceleration.

In the notice itself you've seen, right, it's a demand for payment and accelerates the obligation, it's not simply a notice of a default. The rule is that the automatic stay exists. You know, absent a showing of cause I think the burden of proof is on Commerzbank, and they've admitted, and we don't know, but I don't think it's our burden, what the impact is of setting -- of sending that notice.

What I would like to --

THE COURT: So you essentially are relying on the plain language of the notice to say that in the absence of evident to the contrary it does what it purports to do and that is to take a step forward as opposed to simply staying in place.

MR. KELSEY: Yes, Your Honor. I mean Commerzbank says, you know, we're wrangling over words. That's what lawyers do, and those words are pretty clear in that notice what -- what the notice purports to accelerate and advance the ball forward, and given that on nothing else we think that, you know, the automatic stay should stay, you know, absent some other evidence or testimony to demonstrate to us that the estates aren't going to be harmed.

I mean if it is the case as Commerzbank says that this is ministerial in all due crystallized time that's one thing, right, but then I don't see the harm, this could just happen in the claims reconciliation process. But they're saying, but it may harm us, it may be real harm, we may not have a claim. Well, then lifting the automatic stay actually hurts the debtor's estates by diluting --

THE COURT: But -- I'm sorry to cut your off here, but that's why I threw out the possibility of a second option as opposed to lifting the stay, which is entering into a stipulation that says the motion is resolved not to lift the stay but to simply memorialize everyone's agreement that to the extent that a notice was necessary to preserve the status quo the failure to file such notice will not be raised as a -- as a defense to that and it's a way of not having to get into parse what the actual notice would say, but really it's defining what -- taking the face value that this is a ministerial act and that that might be cleaner than lifting the stay, so that rather than having to grapple with foreign law and make a definitive determination we're essentially saying to the extent that this is the argument we're not going to make that argument, that if it's deemed a ministerial act and that we'll put essentially a pin in it for another day if we ever have to address the issue.

So that's why again, that may be more difficult to

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draft than -- than I think, but at the same time if taking it at face value I don't see that the debtors would be giving -- doing something other than giving away ice in the winter, you would be saying, well, if it's ministerial act designed to retain -- keep the status quo then we're not going raise that as a defense.

MR. KELSEY: But without prejudice to any other of the debtor's --

THE COURT: Without prejudice to any other -- any other rights.

expert on the applicable foreign law, which sounds like it may be difficult to parse even for folks who are, but I'm trying to find a way to sort of crack this nut without going there, because I would think if I deny this on an evidentiary basis, which when all else fails I resort to what evidence I have in front of me, and I don't think I have the evidence because I don't think I've been provided that status quo argument in an evidentiary fashion under foreign law. But if I deny it on that basis I suspect it may rebound right back to the courthouse with such a declaration, we'll be right here parsing it again. Not that I wouldn't look forward to that, but I'm wondering if we can't find a more sensible way to address it.

So let me hear from -- from the movant as to

1 whether there's a way to resolve the issue. I do agree --2 and again, I was looking for something on foreign law -- I 3 do agree that the notice certainly seems to be looking at it 4 with my American eyes something that advances the ball 5 forward. So I -- that doesn't mean I don't -- that I 6 dispute your representation that you need the notice 7 essentially to keep the status quo. So --8 MR. ANTONOFF: Let me -- and I realize I didn't answer your first question. 9 10 No, it is not intended to advance the ball in any 11 way, and if I -- if I haven't made that clear in the two 12 sets of pleadings that we filed already --13 THE COURT: No, you have the problem is the 14 proposed notice I think says one thing and the pleadings may 15 say another. 16 MR. ANTONOFF: But that's where -- but that's 17 where form is elevated over substance. It doesn't matter 18 what the words say because we're not going to collect 19 anything, we're not --20 THE COURT: I think the words always matter. mean if that's -- if that's the intent but the instrument 21 22 says something else then I think at the end of the day any 23 good lawyer is going resort to, well, here's the notice we 24 sent you and it was approved by the Bankruptcy Court. 25 So I don't want to -- I'm fine with putting some

issues on the back burner, but I don't think that it's appropriate for me to approve the filing of a notice that on its face goes further than the status quo and then say, well, nobody meant that.

So I'd much rather have the notice reflect the -- what it actually purports to be --

MR. ANTONOFF: And that's fine, and we can certainly -- and that's why we just attached a form of notice we can work on, we can take the word demand out, we can take the word payment, collect, whatever offensive words are there, we are just trying to maintain the status quo.

As to the second point about evidence. It's true, you don't have evidence, we didn't put it forward and the objection doesn't have any. I guess what you have is two sophisticated law firms that can't answer the question as to whether --

THE COURT: Right. Which is why I'm loathe to weigh in based on what I know.

MR. ANTONOFF: Right. And then finally the -- I very much appreciate Your Honor's innovation in coming up with a stipulation as an approach, the problem from our view with that is that we're here, we have six, seven weeks into this case, we don't know how this guaranteed claim is going to be treated ultimately under a plan and whether it will be for this Court to enforce Commerzbank's right however it's

treated under a plan or whether that claim still will need to be enforced under the laws of Bahrain and whether a stipulation that's says you never had to file --

THE COURT: Send the notice.

MR. ANTONOFF: -- send a demand notice would be representative there, and we hear about repatriating money from Bahrain, I don't know if we know what else they might say about failing to actually deliver a notice.

THE COURT: But -- well then I see that point that I may not be the only court to have to weigh in on it and a stipulation may not be worth the paper it's written on if you're in another court, but then I think you're back to what the words in the notice are, and what I'm hearing from debtors is the status quo they're okay with, but the form of the notice here is -- does not reflect that.

So there may be a form of vanilla notice that essentially would sound a lot like a stipulation but it would be a notice, and so it would be in form, something that would serve your interests not only in this court but in another court.

So -- but again, I don't think I have the information in front of me, based on the record I have in front of me I don't think it's appropriate for me to lift the stay, but I'm not naive enough to think that an order saying that is going to be the end of the matter.

So I would encourage the parties to see if they can come up with an appropriate status quo notice that does not advance the ball forward, because I don't think debtors can in the exercise of their fiduciary obligations agree to a notice that does anything that goes beyond that.

MR. ANTONOFF: Nor would we ask them to nor have we asked them to, and that's not the relief that we're asking for here. I think the problem with a truly plain vanilla status quo notice is that the words of the guarantee do say demand made. So if we send a notice that has the word demand but we're not seeking to collect, allow, or improve our position then I would ask the Court to reconsider and to allow us to do that.

THE COURT: Well, I don't think I can do that on this record because I don't think I have any -- I don't think I have a record as to what is required under the applicable foreign law.

So on the record I have in front of me, the only thing I have are representations of counsel, which are fine, and the actual notice, which on its face goes -- goes further than the status quo, and you may be able to explain to me why that language is necessary. But just as you say a stipulation won't necessarily work in another court, a notice that purports to improve your position, even if it's required outside of this courthouse, may in fact improve

your position, and certainly no lawyer or client is going to say, well, maybe I should get that notice filed and it actually says demand, it has various acceleration provisions, it does various things, why wouldn't we go to a court to enforce it when the time comes?

So I do think that's a classic -- if that's the case that is a classic reason to deny a request for relief from stay.

MR. ANTONOFF: I guess I'm not understanding this.

If -- if we're not permitted to do anything now beyond

deliver a notice and then it's at a later stage that the

guarantee has to be enforced under another law Commerzbank

should not be denied the ability to assert that other law

because of the automatic stay.

THE COURT: But you're framing the question in a particular way. You're framing it and saying the notice that is required for status quo in fact reads differently than preserving the status quo. It reads in a way that is sort of a classic we now have a default, because there's a default we have these additional rights, and that is something that would be barred by the automatic stay.

MR. ANTONOFF: It's not additional rights -sorry, Your Honor -- it's not additional rights, it's the
right to assert a claim under the guarantee, period full
stop. The only addition is that we go from possibly not

having a claim to having a claim, and the only reason we would not have a claim is because of the automatic stay.

There's no substantive improvement of the claim. The claim either exists or it doesn't exist. And if we can't deliver the notice then there's a chance least that it doesn't exist. If we do it will exist, it won't be any better than it would be if the notice had been delivered before the commencement of these cases and there was the 14-day stay period.

THE COURT: Well, I think for purposes of the bankruptcy I would think the argument would be that your obligation to deliver it is tolled. What we're really

MR. ANTONOFF: That -- that's correct.

talking about is what happens in a foreign court I think,

THE COURT: But again, my concern is if that the language of the notice purports to improve your client's position that won't be in front of me where you can say, but that isn't what is meant by it, that was just meant to preserve the status quo.

MR. ANTONOFF: But there will be a claims resolution process in this case that Your Honor will have an opportunity to preside over disputes. So we will file a proof of claim, there will be -- if there is a basis to object there will be an objection.

right?

So I still -- I'm just not seeing the harm to anyone from delivering a notice.

THE COURT: But we're hopping between different jurisdictions. I'm not -- I'm not worried about your rights in this particular courthouse, because I understand the argument and I think a stipulation would solve your problem, but what you said in response to that suggestion is I'm worried about the court overseas. This may not be the only place that it has to be dealt with, I'm worried about the court overseas, but I am worried then about the -- the only thing then would exist would be this notice, and if this notice on its face purports to increase your rights rather than maintain the status quo that's a problem.

I understand you're telling me that the document, the agreement says what has to be in the notice, but that doesn't change the fact that if that language that has to be in this notice increases your rights then it is something that is a problem for purposes of the automatic stay if you're going to be able to run off to another court.

So if I was the only court that dealt with this, you know, we'd be in one world, but I -- that's my -- that's my problem.

MR. ANTONOFF: We're not running off to any other court, we're here, we respect these proceedings, we're participating in these proceedings, we're not going to

1 violate the worldwide stay that's imposed, which is why 2 we're here asking for this very limited relief that we're 3 asking for. 4 THE COURT: Well, we're going in circles now, but 5 But what I understood your position -- and please straighten me out if I've missed it -- is that a 7 stipulation does not work because this is not just a matter 8 for me to look at. And I'm fine with that. I have -- I --9 there's lots of litigation all across the globe and lots of 10 these cases, so that's what I understood is the problem 11 you're trying to fix, to have something that works not only in this jurisdiction but in other jurisdictions, and that's 12 why I'm talking about the foreign court --13 14 MR. ANTONOFF: No, I understand --15 THE COURT: -- because we never know where these 16 things will end up. 17 MR. ANTONOFF: I understand that, but there 18 wouldn't be anything in another foreign court unless we came 19 here and asked you if we could do it in a foreign court or 20 it's after this case is over, the stay is gone, a plan is 21 confirmed, and we have a claim. 22 THE COURT: But then I --23 MR. ANTONOFF: And under a plan --24 THE COURT: If that's the world we live in I don't 25 know -- understand why a stipulation would not solve your

Filed 05/08/12/12/12/12/12/12/15/11 Main Document Page 68 1 But I may be missing something. 2 MR. ANTONOFF: With all due respect I think so, 3 but if I can't explain it then --4 THE COURT: No, I think I got it. But again, I 5 don't have any evidence in front of me on the applicable 6 foreign law, and I think the notice on its face seems to be 7 broader than merely a status quo. 8 So on that basis I'm going to deny the request 9 that I have in front of me without prejudice --10 MR. ANTONOFF: Thank you. 11 THE COURT: -- to supplementing it in the future if there is something that you can say, but I also think 12 13 that there probably is, given the quality of counsel here, a 14 way to deal with Gordian knot in the non-traditional way, 15 right? So there's probably somebody out there with a sword 16 that can cut through this impasse in a way that may be a 17 little creative but may allow you to maintain your rights but not expand them, and that -- again, I think that's the 18 19 concern that's been raised and that's the concern I have is 20 the expanding of the right. 21 MR. ANTONOFF: Okay. And again, we had no 22 intention of expanding of rights, but I thank you for Your 23 Honor's time and comments.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

MR. ROSENTHAL: I believe that's it for today,

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Page 69 1 Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: All right. What I would ask is that 3 you would give me whatever rise orders that you have all in 4 one bunch, so maybe an e-mail or two -- e-mail one of two 5 and so that -- because I'm always concerned about different versions floating around. I do have orders in front of me, 7 but I suspect some of them are still good, but some of them 8 have been superseded. 9 MR. ROSENTHAL: Yes, we'll send a revised set of 10 all of the orders. 11 THE COURT: All right. MR. ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. 12 13 THE COURT: And then we are set to be here again? 14 MR. ROSENTHAL: May 31st. 15 THE COURT: May 31st. 16 MR. ROSENTHAL: I believe at 2 o'clock. 17 2 o'clock. 18 THE COURT: All right. I will just tell you in the interest of full disclosure that there are some other 19 20 proceedings that are taking a lot of time and I don't quite 21 know how the scheduling is playing out with those, so I will 22 do everything I can to keep the 31st on the calendar even if 23 it means moving it early, moving it later, but to the extent

that there's anything of an evidentiary nature that would be

more protracted on the -- on that date please let chambers

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1 know, just because time is a little more limited than I 2 would otherwise like. 3 MR. ROSENTHAL: Your Honor, the only thing that I 4 know of is that we are -- we are in discussions with the 5 committee and the liquidator about making a payment with 6 respect to the Lou Sale transaction, and that payment in 7 order to preserve the value of that property needs to be made by June 1st, and we're hopeful and we've had a number 8 9 of discussions, we're hopeful we'll get to an -- we'll have 10 an agreement with the committee and the JPLs so that we can 11 present a stipulation for the Court. If not though we intend to file a protective motion by the 14th so that it 12 13 can be heard on the 31st. We do not want to miss that. I just want to alert to Court to that -- that deadline. 14 15 THE COURT: All right. 16 MR. ROSENTHAL: We'd need on order on that by the 17 31st. 18 THE COURT: Let me ask, I'm certainly not encouraging that it have to be litigated, but if it does 19 20 have to be litigated what would it look like? Would there 21 be testimony or is it just argument of counsel? 22 MR. ROSENTHAL: I think there may be some 23 testimony involving the valuation of the property. 24 THE COURT: All right. 25 MR. ROSENTHAL: And the effect -- and the effect

Page 71 1 of making the payment, yes. 2 THE COURT: All right. Is that something that you 3 would imagine would be in the realm of the half day or are you looking at a more protracted preceding couple of days? 4 5 MR. ROSENTHAL: No, I think we could probably do 6 it in a half day. 7 THE COURT: All right. 8 MR. ROSENTHAL: At most. 9 THE COURT: That's fine. Thank you. That's 10 exactly the sort of thing I just wanted to have flagged. 11 That's fine. If it cannot be resolved I'd ask that you just 12 keep chambers informed so if we have to move it then we've 13 left you enough time to litigate it, and secondly, if your 14 expectation of what it would take to resolve it short of an 15 agreement among fine counsel changes such that more time 16 would be necessary please let me know that as well, because 17 we may just have to arrange to have a nice evening session 18 and do it that way. 19 MR. ROSENTHAL: We'll do both of those, Your 20 Honor. 21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 Thank you very much. MR. ROSENTHAL: 23 THE COURT: Thank you very much. I see somebody rising, I don't know if there's something else that needs to 24 25 be said before we adjourn?

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1	(Pause)
2	MR. ROSENTHAL: Your Honor, we'll communicate with
3	chambers about any other scheduling issues.
4	THE COURT: All right, thank you.
5	MR. ROSENTHAL: Thank you.
6	(Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 12:30
7	PM)
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Page 76 1 CERTIFICATION 2 3 I, Dawn South, certify that the foregoing transcript is a 4 true and accurate record of the proceedings. 5 Digitally signed by Dawn South DN: cn=Dawn South, o=Veritext, ou, email=digital@veritext.com, c=US Date: 2012.05.08 15:13:05 -04'00' Dawn South 6 7 8 AAERT Certified Electronic Transcriber CET**D-408 9 10 Veritext 11 200 Old Country Road 12 Suite 580 13 Mineola, NY 11501 14 15 16 Date: May 8, 2012 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25